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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Congress Enacts Sanctions Legislation Targeting Russia
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.75
In July 2017, Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions
Act.1 The legislation—which enjoyed nearly unanimous legislative support2—contained
sanctions targeting Russia, North Korea, and Iran.3 Title II of the Act—titled separately as
the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (Countering Russian
Influence Act)—entrenched and extended U.S. sanctions against Russia for violating
Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and interfering with the U.S. presidential election.4
Title II’s key provisions codified existing sanctions against Russia;5 imposed new sanctions
against Russia;6 and restricted the president’s authority to modify or eliminate these sanctions
without congressional approval.7 Despite voicing constitutional objections to the legislation,
President Trump signed the bill into law.8
In 2014, President Obama had imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its purported
annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.9 Russia, acting in contravention of international
law, used force to seize and occupy the so-called Republic of Crimea.10 With Russia’s help,
Ukrainians living in the Crimean Peninsula then approved a ballot referendum—in violation
of the Ukrainian Constitution—declaring the region’s intent to be integrated into the
Russian Federation.11 In response to these developments, President Obama issued four exec-
utive orders12 designed to “send a strong message to the Russian government that there are
consequences for their actions that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Ukraine.”13 These executive orders authorized the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and the
1 Actions Overview H.R. 3664 – 115th Congress (2017–2018), at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con-
gress/house-bill/3364/actions.
2 Id.
3 See generally Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. 115-44 (2017). The Act
imposes two categories of sanctions against North Korea: first, it includes sanctions to enforce and implement
United Nations Security Council Sanctions against North Korea; second, the legislation adds sanctions against
North Korea in response to its human rights abuses. §§ 311–24. Similarly, the Act imposes sanctions against
Iran for human rights abuses in addition to its ballistic missile program and terrorism-related activities.
§§ 104–06. Notably, the congressional review process, described below, see infra notes 48–57 and accompanying
text, does not apply to the sanctions on either Iran or North Korea.
4 See id.; see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States,
111 AJIL 483 (2017) [hereinafter Russian Electoral Interference].
5 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017, 22 U.S.C. § 9522 (2017).
6 22 U.S.C. §§ 9524–29.
7 22 U.S.C. § 9511.
8 Infra notes 58–61.
9 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 108 AJIL 783,
797–808 (2014) [hereinafter Attempted Annexation].
10 See generallyKristina Daugirdas & JulianDavisMortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109
AJIL 175 (2015); Daugirdas & Mortenson, Attempted Annexation, supra note 9.
11 Daugirdas & Mortenson, Attempted Annexation, supra note 9, at 798–805.
12 Exec. Order No. 13685, 79 Fed. Reg. 77357 (2014); Exec. Order No. 13662, 79 Fed. Reg. 16169 (2014);
Exec. Order No. 13661, 79 Fed. Reg. 15535 (2014); Exec. Order No. 13660, 79 Fed. Reg. 13493 (2014).
13 U.S. Dep’t of State, Ukraine and Russia Sanctions, at https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia.
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Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.14 Additionally, the orders put in place travel
restrictions on a number of specified individuals who either “asserted governmental authority
over any part or region of Ukraine without the authorization of the Government of
Ukraine”15 or were
responsible for or complicit in [actions or policies] . . . that undermine democratic pro-
cesses or institutions in Ukraine . . . threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or
territorial integrity of Ukraine; or . . . misappropriat[e] . . . state assets of Ukraine or of an
economically significant entity of Ukraine.16
In December 2016, President Obama imposed additional sanctions on Russia in retalia-
tion for its interference with the U.S. presidential election.17 Shortly before the general elec-
tion the preceding month, the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence published an outline of the case for their conclusion that
Russia had engaged in cyberattacks with the intent to influence the presidential election.18
These findings, along with corroborating evidence from other intelligence agencies,
prompted President Obama to impose additional sanctions via executive order against five
Russian entities and four Russian individuals—all of whom had, according to President
Obama, engaged in, or provided material support to persons or entities engaged in, “tamper-
ing, altering, or causing a misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of
interfering with the 2016 U.S. election processes.”19
Since President Trump took office in January, his administration’s stance on Russian sanc-
tions has seemed to evolve.WhiteHouse Economic Adviser Gary Cohn remarked in lateMay
that President Trump was “looking at” the future of the Russian sanctions, and that the
administration currently “[did not] have a position” on whether they should stay.20 But a
few days later, Cohn said the administration would “not lower[] our sanctions on
Russia”21 and, “[i]f anything, we would probably look to get tougher on Russia.”22 As
14 Exec. Order No. 13685, supra note 12 (blocking the property of any person dealing in Crimea and prohib-
iting persons in the United States from: investing in Crimea; importing Crimean goods or services; exporting
goods or services to Crimea; and facilitating or supporting a transaction involving Crimean goods or services);
Exec. Order No. 13662, supra note 12 (blocking the “property and interests in property that are in the United
States” belonging to persons operating in the Russian economy from being “transferred, paid, exported, with-
drawn, or otherwise dealt in”); Exec. Order No. 13661, supra note 12 (blocking the property of persons deemed
to be a Russian government official, a Russian arms supplier, or an individual providing material assistance to a
Russian government official or arms supplier); Exec. Order No. 13660, supra note 12 (blocking the property of
persons “responsible for or complicit in” actions contributing to the crisis in Ukraine).
15 Exec. Order No. 13660, supra note 12.
16 Id.
17 Daugirdas & Mortenson, Russian Electoral Interference, supra note 4.
18 Id. at 483.
19 White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/fact-sheet-
actions-response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity-and.
20 Max Greenwood, Official: Trump “Looking at” Future of US Sanctions on Russia, HILL (May 25, 2017), at
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/335244-official-trump-looking-at-future-of-us-sanctions-on-
russia.
21 Margaret Talev & Jennifer Jacobs, Trump to Keep Russia Sanctions, Economic Adviser Cohn Says, BLOOMBERG
POLITICS (May 26, 2017), at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-26/trump-to-maintain-russia-
sanctions-economic-adviser-cohn-says.
22 Id.
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Congress deliberated over legislative proposals, White House Deputy Press Secretary Sarah
Huckabee Sanders affirmed that the administration “believe[s] the existing executive branch
sanctions regime is the best tool for compelling Russia to fulfill its commitments.”23
At least partly in response to concern that the Trump Administration might remove some
of the Obama sanctions, Congress passed the Countering Russian Influence Act. During
floor debate on the proposed legislation, Senator Cardin remarked:
The legislation we are about to vote on will give the United States the strongest possible
hand to stand up against the aggression of Russia. Russia attacked us and our democratic
institutions; Russia invaded the sovereignty of other countries, including Ukraine and
Georgia . . . .
. . .
Mandatory sanctions are included in this legislation with regard to the energy sector, the
financial sector, the intelligence and defense sectors—not only with primary sanctions
but with secondary sanctions.
. . .
This legislation provides a review process so the President, on his own, cannot eliminate
sanctions. He must come to Congress.
. . .
This is a tough bill to stand up to what Russia has done and requires mandatory action.24
Other legislators likewise made clear that the legislation was meant to prevent President
Trump from relaxing sanctions against Russia.25 Despite the administration’s objections
that the provisions interfered with the president’s foreign policy authority,26 the final
House and Senate votes were close to unanimous in approving the bill.27
As approved by Congress, the Act enacts two sets of sanctions. First, it entrenches as leg-
islation the six executive orders that President Obama issued in response to Russian interfer-
ence in Ukraine and in the U.S. presidential election.28 Second, it imposes a new set of
“mandatory” sanctions against Russia that go beyond those imposed by the Obama admin-
istration. On the latter front, sections 224 through 234 provide that the president “shall”
impose additional sanctions relating to cybersecurity, natural resource mining, financial
23White House Press Release, Press Gaggle by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Sanders (June 15, 2017),
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/15/press-gaggle-principal-deputy-press-secretary-sarah-
sanders-6152017.
24 163 CONG. REC. S4,387, S4,387 (2017).
25 See id. at S4,388 (statement of Sen. Brown) (“The bill provides for a range of tough sanctions against . . .
Russia . . . . This bill will prevent President Trump from relaxing sanctions on Russia without congressional review.
We are all concerned about that.”); see also id. at S4,387 (statement of Sen. McCain) (arguing that the legislation
would impose “mandatory sanctions” to “respond to Russia’s attack on American democracy”).
26 See Richard Lardner,White House Criticizes Russia Sanctions Stalled in House, PBS (July 11, 2017), at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/white-house-criticizes-russia-sanctions-stalled-house.
27 Actions Overview H.R. 3664, supra note 1.
28 22 U.S.C. §§ 9522, 9524–29.
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institutions, corruption, human rights abuses, intelligence sharing, and arms sales to Syria.29
These sanctions use a variety of methods to pressure Russia, including: blocking assets;30
denying or revoking visas;31 imposing import and export restrictions;32 restricting U.S. finan-
cial institutions from opening andmaintaining accounts affiliated with certain foreign nation-
als;33 barring the Export-Import Bank from supporting the export of goods or services to
certain persons or regions;34 prohibiting the U.S. government from entering into contracts
with sanctioned persons;35 and forbidding financial institutions from loaning money to sanc-
tioned individuals.36
While the Countering Russian Influence Act describes the second group of sanctions as
“mandatory,” some of them only materialize if the president determines that persons meet
the statutory criteria for their imposition.37 For example, Sections 224, 228, 231, 232,
233, and 234 all specify that the president “shall impose” sanctions but only if he first deter-
mines that persons “knowingly” engaged in conduct proscribed by those respective sec-
tions.38 Conduct triggering the imposition of sanctions includes: engaging in malicious
cyberactivity;39 investing in Russian crude oil projects;40 facilitating a “significant financial
transaction” on behalf of sanctioned Russian persons;41 perpetrating human rights abuses;42
participating in corrupt practices;43 engaging in transactions with persons involved in Russian
intelligence or defense sectors;44 investing in Russian energy development;45 and investing in
Russian state-owned assets.46 Sections 225 and 226 require sanctions to be imposed “unless it
is not in the national interest of the United States to do so.”47
The Act establishes a new congressional review process.48 That congressional review
process applies to both the codified Obama-era sanctions as well as the new sanctions.49
Section 216 describes that process, starting by requiring before taking any action to modify
those sanctions, the president must “submit to the appropriate congressional committees
and leadership a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that
29 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, supra note 3, §§ 224–35.
30 Id., §§ 224(b)(1), 227–28.
31 Id., §§ 224(b)(2), 235(a)(11).
32 Id., §§ 225, 235(a)(1)–(2).
33 Id., § 226.
34 Id., § 235(a)(1).
35 Id., § 235(a)(6).
36 Id., § 235(a)(5).
37 E.g., id., § 224(a) (stating that the president shall impose sanctions on “any person that the President deter-
mines” meets several statutory criteria).
38 See id., §§ 224(a)(1), 228(a), 231(a), 232(a), 233(a), 234(a)(1).
39 Id., § 224(a).
40 Id., § 225.
41 Id., § 226.
42 Id., § 228.
43 Id., § 227.
44 Id., § 231.
45 Id., § 232.
46 Id., § 233.
47 Id., §§ 225–26.
48 See id., § 216.
49 Id., § 216(a)(2)(B)(i)(I).
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action.”50 Section 216(a)(2) continues by listing the actions that trigger the reporting require-
ment and congressional review process:
(2) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in this paragraph is—
(i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions described in subpara-
graph (B);
(ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the
President with respect to a person, an action to waive the application of those
sanctions with respect to that person; or
(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United States’ foreign policy with
regard to the Russian Federation.
(B) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described in this subparagraph are—
(i) sanctions provided for under—
(I) this chapter or any provision of law amended by this title, including the
Executive orders codified under section 222 . . .;
(II) the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic
Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.); or
(III) the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.); and
(ii) the prohibition on access to the properties of the Government of the Russian
Federation located in Maryland and New York that the President ordered
vacated on December 29, 2016.51
Once the president proposes an action triggering Section 216’s reporting requirement, the
Act requires the report to describe whether that action is “intended to significantly alter
United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.”52 For all proposed
actions intended to “significantly alter”U.S. policy toward Russia, the president must include
a description of:
(i) the significant alteration to United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian
Federation;
(ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national security interests of the United
States; and
(iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions affected by the action were initially
imposed.53
Congress then has thirty days from the filing of the report to review the proposed action.54
Section 216 prohibits the president from taking the proposed action during that thirty-day
review period “unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to that action is enacted”
50 22 U.S.C. § 9511(a)(1).
51 22 U.S.C. § 9511(a)(2).
52 22 U.S.C. § 9511(a)(3).
53 22 U.S.C. § 9511(a)(4)(A).
54 22 U.S.C. § 9511(b)(1).
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pursuant to the Act.55 Congress may authorize the president to take the proposed action by
passing a resolution of approval or prohibit the president from acting by passing a resolution
of disapproval.56 The president may veto a disapproval resolution subject to congressional
override.57
President Trump signed the bill into law on August 2, 2017.58 The president issued two
statements about the legislation. In his initial statement, the president asserted that the bill
inappropriately interfered with his ability to direct foreign affairs:
[T]he bill remains seriously flawed—particularly because it encroaches on the executive
branch’s authority to negotiate . . . . By limiting the Executive’s flexibility, this bill makes
it harder for the United States to strike good deals for the American people, and will drive
China, Russia, and North Korea much closer together. The Framers of our Constitution
put foreign affairs in the hands of the President. This bill will prove the wisdom of that
choice.59
Subsequently, the president noted in his formal signing statement that:
In its haste to pass this legislation, the Congress included a number of clearly unconsti-
tutional provisions. For instance, although I share the policy views of sections 253 and
257, those provisions purport to displace the President’s exclusive constitutional author-
ity to recognize foreign governments, including their territorial bounds, in conflict with
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry.
Additionally, section 216 seeks to grant the Congress the ability to change the law outside
the constitutionally required process. The bill prescribes a review period that precludes
the President from taking certain actions. Certain provisions in section 216, however,
conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha, because they purport to
allow the Congress to extend the review period through procedures that do not satisfy the
requirements for changing the law under Article I, section 7 of the Constitution. I nev-
ertheless expect to honor the bill’s extended waiting periods to ensure that the Congress
will have a full opportunity to avail itself of the bill’s review procedures.60
Despite his concerns, the president indicated that he signed the legislation “for the sake of
national unity.”61
Russian officials warned the United States that the Act would harm bilateral relations and
prompt Russia to take retaliatory measures. In the days leading up to Congress’s approval of
the Act, President Putin remarked that Russia had remained “restrained and patient”with the
55 22 U.S.C. § 9511(b)(3).
56 22 U.S.C. § 9511(b)(3)–(6).
57 Id.
58 Actions Overview H.R. 3664, supra note 1.
59White House Press Release, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Signing the “Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” (Aug. 2, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/
02/statement-president-donald-j-trump-signing-countering-americas [hereinafter Aug. 2 Trump Statement].
60 White House Press Release, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on the Signing of H.R. 3364 (Aug. 2,
2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/02/statement-president-donald-j-trump-sign-
ing-hr-3364.
61 Aug. 2 Trump Statement, supra note 59.
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United States.62 “At a certain moment,” Putin continued, “we will have to respond.”63
Russia’s deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov said that “[t]he authors and sponsors of
this bill are making a very serious step toward destruction of prospects for normalizing rela-
tions with Russia and do not conceal that that’s their target.”64 PrimeMinisterMedvedev also
lamented the legislation marked an end to “[t]he hope for improving our relations with the
new U.S. administration.”65
Shortly after Congress passed the law, the Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement
condemning the United States and outlining its own plans for retaliation. The Foreign
Ministry wrote:
On July 27, the US Congress passed a new bill on tougher anti-Russia sanctions. This
measure is further proof of the Unites States’ extremely hostile foreign policy. Hiding
behind its sense of superiority, the United States arrogantly ignores the stances and inter-
ests of other countries.
It is common knowledge that the Russian Federation has been doing everything in its
power to improve bilateral relations, to encourage ties and cooperation with the US
on the most pressing issues . . . .
. . .
Meanwhile, the United States is using Russia’s alleged interference in its domestic affairs
as an absolutely contrived excuse for its persevering and crude campaigns against Russia.
This activity contradicts the principles of international law, the UN Charter, WTO reg-
ulations and, simply, the standards of [civilized] international communication.
The United States continues to pass more unlawful sanctions against Russia, to seize
Russia’s diplomatic property, which is [formalized] in binding bilateral documents,
and to deport Russian diplomats. This is clearly a violation of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations and generally [recognized] diplomatic practices.
The adoption of the new sanctions bill is an obvious indication that relations with Russia
are being dragged down by political infighting in the United States. Moreover, the new
bill uses political means to create a dishonest competitive advantage for the US in the
global economy. This blackmail aimed at restricting Russia’s cooperation with its foreign
partners threatens many countries and international businesses.66
The Russian Foreign Ministry then ordered the United States to reduce its “diplomatic and
technical staff” then serving in Russia to 455 people, a number equal to “the number of
62 Andrew Higgins, Putin Derides Sanctions and Trump Investigations as ‘Boorishness,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 27,
2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/world/europe/putin-sanctions-trump-investigations.html.
63 Id.
64 Neil MacFarquhar, Lawmakers in Russia Call for Retaliation Against NewU.S. Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (JulY 26,
2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/europe/us-sanctions-russia.html.
65 Vladimir Isachenkov, Russia Accuses Donald Trump ofWaging ‘Full-Scale TradeWar’ After U.S. President Signs
New Sanctions Bill, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 3, 2017), at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/donald-
trump-sanctions-russia-signs-bill-trade-war-dmitry-medvedev-a7874201.html.
66 Embassy of the Russian Federation Press Release, Foreign Ministry’s Statement (July 28, 2017), at http://
www.russianembassy.org/article/foreign-ministry%E2%80%99s-statement.
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Russian diplomats and technical staff currently working in the United States.”67 The Foreign
Ministry also announced that the United States would no longer have access to storage facil-
ities “on Dorozhnaya Street in Moscow and [at] the country house in Serebryany Bor. . . .”68
The statement ended with the Ministry’s warning that “Russia reserves the right to resort to
other measures affecting US’ interests on a retaliatory basis.”69
The United States condemned Russia’s retaliatory measures. On July 31—several days
before President Trump signed the legislation—Vice President Pence commented on
Russia’s embassy restrictions:
President Trump has called on Russia to cease its destabilizing activities in Ukraine and
elsewhere and to cease its support for hostile regimes like North Korea and Iran.
And under President Trump, the United States will continue to hold Russia accountable
for its actions—and we call on our European allies and friends to do the same.
. . .
The preference of the United States is a constructive relationship with Russia based on
cooperation on common interests . . . . Regrettably, last week Russia took the drastic step
of limiting the United States’ diplomatic presence in their nation.
President Trump has made it clear: America is open to a better relationship with Russia.
But the President and our Congress are unified in our message: A better relationship and
the lifting of sanctions will require Russia to reverse the actions that caused sanctions to
be imposed in the first place.
We hope for better days and better relations with Russia, but as I said earlier today, recent
diplomatic actions taken byMoscow will not deter the commitment of the United States
to our security, that of our allies, and to freedom-loving nations around the world.70
The day after Russia announced its new restrictions, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
issued a press release stating that:
[t]he near unanimous votes for the sanctions legislation in Congress represent the strong
will of the American people to see Russia take steps to improve relations with the United
States.We hope that there will be cooperation between our two countries onmajor global
issues and these sanctions will no longer be necessary.71
On August 31, the State Department announced that it would require Russia “to close its




70 Office of the Vice President Press Release, Remarks by the Vice President to Enhanced Forward Presence and
Estonian Troops (July 31, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/07/31/remarks-vice-
president-enhanced-forward-presence-and-estonian-troops.
71 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, On Sanctions Legislation (July 29, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/secre-
tary/remarks/2017/07/272938.htm.
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a consular annex in New York City.”72 State Department officials designated the closures as
formal retaliation against Russia:
With this action both countries will remain with three consulates each. While there will
continue to be a disparity in the number of diplomatic and consular annexes, we have
chosen to allow the Russian Government to maintain some of its annexes in an effort
to arrest the downward spiral in our relationship.
The United States hopes that, having moved toward the Russian Federation’s desire for
parity, we can avoid further retaliatory actions by both sides and move forward to achieve
the stated goal of both of our presidents: improved relations between our two countries
and increased cooperation on areas of mutual concern. The United States is prepared to
take further action as necessary and as warranted.73
The State Department gave Russia until September 2 to complete the closures.74
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
United States and Qatar Sign Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Terrorism Financing
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.98
On July 11, 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson signed a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) between the United States and Qatar, thereby establishing a joint plan to
investigate and eliminate the financing of terrorism.1 The agreement was signed against a
backdrop of conflict between Qatar and a number of its regional neighbors, particularly
Saudi Arabia. While it appears that negotiations between Qatar and the United States pre-
dated the formal standoff between Qatar and its neighbors, Qatar has invoked the MOU to
defend itself against Saudi accusations of terror financing.
In May, Tillerson and President Donald Trump had traveled to Saudi Arabia, where
Trump signed a joint “strategic vision” with the Saudi government and Tillerson outlined
the countries’ common counterterrorism goals.2 During the same visit Trump also met
with the heads of the countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a group consisting
of all the Arab states in the Persian Gulf except Iraq.3




1 Carol Morello & Kareem Fahim, Qatar Agrees to Combat Terrorism Financing Under Deal with U.S., WASH.
POST (July 11, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/qatar-agrees-to-curb-terrorism-financing-
under-deal-with-us/2017/07/11/1a86e3b0-a041-4300-ab03-c840d8a19bcf_story.html.
2 Philip Rucker & Karen DeYoung, Trump Signs ‘Tremendous’Deals with Saudi Arabia on His First Day Overseas,
WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-gets-elaborate-welcome-in-saudi-
arabia-embarking-on-first-foreign-trip/2017/05/20/679f2766-3d1d-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html.
3 Id.
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The next month, a group of Arab countries led by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates cut off diplomatic ties with Qatar and commenced an “air, sea, and
land blockade” of the small Gulf state.4 The countries justified the blockade as a response
to Qatar’s purported violation of a 2014 agreement by GCC member states, which requires
that the nations “not undermine the ‘interests, security, and stability’ of each other.”5 The
blockading states argued that Qatar had violated this obligation by financing terrorist activ-
ities and “embrac[ing] various terrorist and sectarian groups aimed at destabilizing the
region.”6 In addition, the standoff is apparently related to the blockading states’ disapproval
of Qatar’s relationship with Iran. Earlier this year, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates blocked Qatari media when a story published on state-run news
sites published statements attributed to the Qatari emir that supported Iran and Hamas
(for example, calling Iran an “Islamic power”7) and speculated that President “Trump
might not be in power for long.”8 Qatar denied that the emir had made any such statement
and claimed that the websites had been hacked by some outside actor—a claim reportedly bol-
stered by a U.S. intelligence finding that the hack had actually been perpetrated by the UAE.9
News of the U.S.-Qatar MOU emerged as part of the U.S. response to the blockade of
Qatar, which hosts a large American air base and has extensive ties to the United States.
While President Trump praised Saudi Arabia in strong but general terms in the wake of the
May 2017 Riyadh Summit,10 the State Department’s more specific interventions into the
Qatar dispute have built on Secretary Tillerson’s evaluation of Qatar’s position as “reason-
able.”11 In a press briefing after Tillerson’s comment, spokesperson Heather Nauert stated:
4 Liz Sly, Qatar Responds to the Demands of Saudi Arabia as Trump Weighs in, WASH. POST (July 3, 2017), at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/qatar-responds-to-the-demands-of-saudi-arabia-and-its-
allies/2017/07/03/88420336-5ff9-11e7-80a2-8c226031ac3f_story.html. Yemen, the Maldives, and the eastern
Libyan government joined the blockade. Patrick Wintour, Gulf Plunged into Diplomatic Crisis as Countries Cut
Ties with Qatar, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2017), at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-
and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism.
5 Gulf States Agree to Deal to End Qatar Tensions, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 17, 2014), at http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/middleeast/2014/04/gulf-states-agree-deal-end-qatar-tensions-2014417221056589789.html (describing
circumstances under which the 2014 agreement was reached). For text of the 2013 and 2014 agreements obtained
and translated by CNN, see http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/07/10/translation.of.agreementsup-
dated.pdf.
6 Wintour, supra note 4. Anne Barnard & David D. Kirkpatrick, 5 Arab Nations Move to Isolate Qatar, Putting
the U.S. in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/world/middleeast/qatar-
saudi-arabia-egypt-bahrain-united-arab-emirates.html.
7 KarenDeYoung&EllenNakashima,UAEOrchestratedHacking of Qatari Government Sites, Sparking Regional
Upheaval, According to U.S. Intelligence Officials, WASH. POST (July 16, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/uae-hacked-qatari-government-sites-sparking-regional-upheaval-according-to-us-
intelligence-officials/2017/07/16/00c46e54-698f-11e7-8eb5-cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html.
8 Barnard & Kirkpatrick, supra note 6; Wintour, supra note 4.
9 DeYoung & Nakashima, supra note 7.
10 Michael D. Shear & Peter Baker, Saudis Welcome Trump’s Rebuff of Obama’s Mideast Views, N.Y. TIMES
(May 20, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/world/middleeast/donald-trump-saudi-arabia.html.
Trump said, “They’re doing a great job, they’re going to be doing something very special. You see it with terrorism,
the funding of terrorism. It’s going to stop, going to stop the funding of radical Islamic terrorism.” Trump Praises
Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST (June 7, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/trump-praises-
saudi-arabia/2017/06/07/4136e148-4ba7-11e7-987c-42ab5745db2e_video.html.
11Morello& Fahim, supra note 1; see also Sly, supra note 4 (“AWhiteHouse statement suggested, however, that
Trump continues to back Saudi Arabia and its allies against Qatar, despite efforts by Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson to adopt a more measured approach.”).
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Now that it’s been more than two weeks since the embargo started, we are mystified that
the Gulf states have not released to the public, nor to the Qataris, the details about the
claims that they are making toward Qatar. The more that time goes by, the more doubt is
raised about the actions taken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At this point, we are left
with one simple question: Were the actions really about their concerns regarding Qatar’s
alleged support for terrorism, or were they about the long simmering grievances between
and among the GCC countries?12
On this background, Secretary Tillerson announced U.S.-Qatar MOU at a press confer-
ence on July 11. Asked about the effect of the memorandum on the diplomatic tensions
between Qatar and the GCC countries, Secretary Tillerson responded:
[T]he agreement that was signed today is an agreement that we have been working on for
quite some time. In fact, there’s elements of this work that actually had been underway as
long as a year ago. So what I think you’re seeing the culmination today is really of this
reinvigoration of our talks as a result of the Riyadh summit. And President Trump’s very
strong call in Qatar, I think, has taken the initiative to move out on things that had been
discussed but had not been brought to a conclusion, and to put in place a very, very strong
agreement, one that has commitments for action immediately in a number of fronts, and
in fact, several steps have already been taken and implemented.
As it relates to the conflict that exists here in the Gulf, we had a good trilateral exchange
around the conflict with His Highness The Emir and the foreign minister, with our
Kuwaiti mediator partner. And my role here is to support the efforts of the Emir of
Kuwait and the Kuwaiti mediator to bring what we can to the discussions to help
both sides more fully understand the concerns of the relative parties and also point
out possible solutions to those.13
Qatari Foreign Minister Al-Thani agreed:
Just to follow up what His Excellency just mentioned, this agreement which was signed,
which is being signed now, it’s a separate bilateral agreement between Qatar and the
United States which has been underway and in discussion for weeks now, and it has noth-
ing related directly to or indirectly to the recent crisis and the blockade which is imposed
against Qatar.14
While the memorandum may not have originated as a response to the blockade of Qatar,
the Qatari foreign minister indicated that Qatar would use the memorandum to move nego-
tiations with the GCC states forward:
But the main output was the memorandum of understanding pertaining to combating
financing terrorism, which for long the blockading countries have accused Qatar of
financing terrorism. Now the state of Qatar is the first country to sign this memorandum
12 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Briefing, Spokesperson Heather Nauert, Department Press Briefing (June 20,
2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/06/272056.htm.
13 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Press Availability with Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin
Abdulrahman al-Thani (July 11, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/07/272522.htm.
14 Id.
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of understanding with the United States.We invite the other blockading countries to join
signing this understanding.15
The text of theMOU has not been released, and official sources have been vague about the
substantive details. Secretary Tillerson characterized the agreement, in the joint press confer-
ence announcing its signing, as containing benchmarks, information-sharing requirements,
and provisions for tracking and disabling terror funding:
The agreement in which we both have signed on behalf of our governments represents
weeks of intensive discussions between experts and reinvigorates the spirit of the Riyadh
summit. The memorandum lays out a series of steps the two countries will take over the
coming months and years to interrupt and disable terror financing flows and intensify
counterterrorism activities globally. The agreement includes milestones to ensure both
countries are accountable to their commitments.
Together, the United States and Qatar will do more to track down funding sources, will
do more to collaborate and share information, and will do more to keep the region and
our homeland safe.16
Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, issued a joint
statement in response to the memorandum of understanding. The four countries indicated
that, although they valued the efforts of the United States, the memorandum was not suffi-
cient for them to lift their blockade:
The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Combating the Financing of
Terrorism between the United States and the Qatari authorities is the result of the
repeated pressures and demands over the past years by the four countries and their part-
ners to stop its support for terrorism with the assertion that this step is not enough and
that the four countries will closely monitor the seriousness of the authorities in its fight
against all forms of terrorist financing, its support and embrace.
The four countries emphasize that the measures they have taken have been because of the
continuation of various activities of the Qatari authorities in supporting and financing
terrorism, harboring extremists, spreading hatred and extremism and interfering in the
internal affairs of other countries. These activities must be fully and definitively stopped
in implementation of the legitimate and just demands.
The Qatari authorities have consistently revoked all the agreements and commitments,
the most recent of which was the Riyadh Agreement (2013), which led to the withdrawal
of ambassadors and their return only after the Qatari authorities signed the supplemen-
tary agreement (2014)17 and their continued intervention, incitement, conspiracy, har-
boring of terrorists, financing terrorist acts and spreading hatred and extremism, with
which it cannot be trusted in any commitment it makes according to its existing policy
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 These comments appear to refer to the two agreements Qatar signed with its fellow Gulf Cooperation
Council members. See supra note 5.
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without the establishment of strict controls to verify the seriousness of its return to the
normal and right track.
The four countries also reiterate the continuation of their current procedures until the
Qatari authorities are committed to the implementation of the just and full demands that
will ensure that terrorism is addressed and stability and security are established in the
region.18
The next day, the Saudi-led group issued a list of thirteen demands to Qatar, including,
among others, that it must shut down Al Jazeera and its affiliates, close its diplomatic outposts
in Iran, and pay an undisclosed amount of money for “loss of life and other financial losses
caused by [their] policies . . . .”19 The list included demands that Qatar cut ties with groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIL, cut funding to individual terrorists and terrorist
groups, and deliver terrorist fugitives to their countries of origin.20 The group gave Qatar ten
days to comply, leaving the consequences unspecified.21 Qatar denied any involvement in
either the funding of terrorism or the publication of the inflammatory statements, insisting
that the “many false allegations directed at the State of Qatar [were] made for political gains
and to tarnish the public opinion’s image of the State of Qatar.”22
The Gulf State standoff continues. “Right now,” said Tillerson, “the parties are not even
talking to one another at any level.”23
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Trump Reverses Certain Steps Toward Normalizing Relations with Cuba
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.93
In June 2017, President Donald Trump announced a plan to roll back various steps taken
by his predecessor toward normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. A
senior official for the administration announced the plan in a White House press briefing:
The President vowed to reverse the Obama administration policies toward Cuba that
have enriched the Cuban military regime and increased the repression on the island.
18 Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Press Release, Joint Statement by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, The United Arab
Emirates, and Bahrain Regarding MOU to Combat Terrorism Between the U.S. and Qatar (July 11, 2017), at
https://saudiembassy.net/statements/joint-statement-saudi-arabia-egypt-united-arab-emirates-and-bahrain-
regarding-mou-combat.




22 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, Qatar Denounces Statement Made by Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Bahrain, and UAE (June 9, 2017), at https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/06/09/qatar-
denounces-statement-made-by-saudi-arabia-egypt-bahrain-and-uae.
23 Gardiner Harris, Tillerson Comes Up Short in Effort to Resolve Qatar Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2017), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/world/middleeast/qatar-saudi-arabia-rex-tillerson.html.
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It is a promise that President Trump made, and it’s a promise that President Trump is
keeping.
With this is a readjustment of the United States policy towards Cuba. And you will see
that, going forward, the new policy under the Trump administration, will empower
the Cuban people. To reiterate, the new policy going forward does not target the
Cuban people, but it does target the repressive members of the Cuban military
government.1
Relations between the United States and Cuba had been rife with conflict for more than
half a century when, in 2014, President Obama initiated a major shift in U.S. policy and
announced a plan to “reestablish diplomatic relations . . . , review Cuba’s designation as a
State Sponsor of Terrorism . . .[, and] take[] steps to increase travel, commerce, and the
flow of information to and from Cuba.”2 The U.S. Treasury and Commerce Departments
subsequently revised various regulations to “facilitate travel to Cuba for authorized purposes,
. . . and allow a number of . . . activities related to, among other areas, telecommunications,
financial services, trade, and shipping.”3 In the months and years that followed, the United
States and Cuba took further steps to normalize ties.4 The final weeks of the Obama admin-
istration yielded bilateral agreements with the Cuban government on a range of issues, includ-
ing: a memorandum of understanding relating to plant and animal health to facilitate trade in
agricultural goods;5 a treaty to delimit the maritime boundary between the two countries in
the eastern Gulf of Mexico;6 an agreement to improve the environmental management of
protected areas in Cuba and Florida;7 an “agreement to strengthen cooperation in the field
of maritime and aeronautical search and rescue”;8 a “Memorandum of Understanding to
1 White House Press Release, Background Briefing on the President’s Cuba Policy (June 15, 2017), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/15/background-briefing-presidents-cuba-policy, [hereinafter
Background Briefing on the President's Cuba Policy].
2 White House Press Release, Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes (Dec. 17, 2014), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policy-changes; see also Kristina
Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 407, 415 (2015).
3 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury Press Release, Fact Sheet: Treasury and Commerce Announce Regulatory
Amendments to the Cuba Sanctions (Jan. 15, 2015), at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/jl9740.aspx. The Treasury regulations can be found at 31 C.F.R. §515 (2015); the Commerce regulations
can be found at 15 C.F.R. §§730–74 (2015).
4 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 663,
666–67 (2015); Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109
AJIL 407, 415–19 (2015).
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba Press Release, Cuba and the United States Sign Memorandum
of Understanding in the Field of Plant and Animal Health (Jan. 20, 2017), at http://www.minrex.gob.
cu/en/cuba-and-united-states-sign-memorandum-understanding-field-animal-and-plant-health (“This new
Memorandum is mainly intended to contribute to prevent the introduction and spread of quarantine pests, animal
and plant disease agents and vectors in the United States and Cuba . . . .”).
6 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, United States and Cuba SignMaritime Treaty Boundary (Jan. 18, 2017), at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/01/267117.htm (noting the treaty will be submitted to the Senate
for its advice and consent).
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba Press Release, Cuba and the United States Signed Twinning Agreement
Between Ciénaga de Zapata and Everglades National Parks (Jan. 18, 2017), at http://www.minrex.gob.cu/en/
cuba-and-united-states-signed-twinning-agreement-between-cienaga-de-zapata-and-everglades-national.
8 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, United States and Cuba Sign Search and Rescue Agreement (Jan. 18, 2017),
at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/01/267107.htm.
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deepen law enforcement cooperation and information sharing”;9 and an “agreement to pre-
pare for and respond to oil spills and hazardous substance pollution in the Gulf ofMexico and
the Straits of Florida.”10
In addition, on January 12, 2017, President Obama ended the “wet foot/dry foot” policy
on Cuban immigration to the United States.11 That policy had been adopted by the Clinton
Administration in 1995 and, as explained by the New York Times, “owes its name to its
unusual rules, which require Cubans caught trying to reach the United States by sea to return
home, yet allow those who make it onto American soil to stay and eventually apply for legal,
permanent residency.”12 Obama explained the policy change:
Today, the United States is taking important steps forward to normalize relations with
Cuba and to bring greater consistency to our immigration policy. The Department of
Homeland Security is ending the so-called “wet-foot/dry foot” policy, which was put
in place more than twenty years ago and was designed for a different era. Effective imme-
diately, Cuban nationals who attempt to enter the United States illegally and do not qual-
ify for humanitarian relief will be subject to removal, consistent with U.S. law and
enforcement priorities. By taking this step, we are treating Cuban migrants the same
way we treat migrants from other countries. The Cuban government has agreed to accept
the return of Cuban nationals who have been ordered removed, just as it has been accept-
ing the return of migrants interdicted at sea.13
TheCuban government had condemned the “dry feet-wet feet” policy as “a stimulus for irreg-
ular migration, trafficking of migrants and irregular entry into the United States” and as “an
incitement to illegal exits” that led to
migratory crises, hijacking of ships and aircraft and the commission of crimes, such as
trafficking in migrants, trafficking in persons, immigration fraud and the use of violence
with a destabilizing extraterritorial impact on other countries of the region, used as transit
to arrive in US territory.14
As a candidate, President Trump criticized his predecessor’s policies with respect to Cuba,
and articulated his intention to reverse them.15 In February 2017, shortly after President
9 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, United States and Cuba To Sign Law Enforcement Memorandum of
Understanding (Jan. 16, 2017), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/01/267007.htm.
10 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, United States and Cuba Sign Bilateral Oil Spill Preparedness and Response
Agreement (Jan. 9, 2017), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/01/266726.htm.
11 White House Press Release, Statement by the President on Cuban Immigration Policy (Jan. 12, 2017), at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/12/statement-president-cuban-immigration-
policy [hereinafter Obama on Cuban Immigration Policy].
12 Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Frances Robles,Obama Ends Exemption for Cubans Who Arrive Without Visas, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/world/americas/cuba-obama-wet-foot-dry-foot-
policy.html.
13 Obama on Cuban Immigration Policy, supra note 11.
14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba Press Release, Declaration by the Revolutionary Government (Jan. 16,
2017), at http://www.minrex.gob.cu/en/declaration-revolutionary-government-0.
15 Patricia Mazzei & Amy Sherman, Trump Learns to Play Miami’s Ethnic Politics, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 16,
2016), at http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/donald-trump/article102378397.
html (quoting Donald Trump as saying the following at a campaign rally: “All of the concessions Barack
Obama has granted the Castro regime were done through executive order—which means the next president
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Trump was sworn into office, he ordered a full review of U.S. policy toward Cuba.16 Two
months later, anonymous sources within the Trump administration informed journalists that
the administration was working on plans to roll back the renewal of diplomatic ties.17 The
president’s plan was officially announced one month later, on June 15.18 A senior adminis-
tration official previewed some elements during a White House press briefing the evening
before the plan was announced:
There’s a few components of it. One part is . . . measures designed to restrict the flow of
money to the oppressive elements of the Cuban regime—the military, intelligence, and
security services.
There are also measures to ensure that the statutory ban on tourism is strictly enforced,
which will include ending the individual people-to-people travel.19 There are 12 catego-
ries of travel that are permitted still, but the one of the individual people-to-people travel
was one that was at the highest risk of potential abuse of the statutory ban on tourism.
And then there are several other components of the policy that you’ll see tomorrow that
relate to the supporting requirements ensuring that these regulations are enforced.20
The policy itself is reflected in a National Security Presidential Memorandum on
Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba. That Memorandum provides,
in part, that:
It shall be the policy of the executive branch to:
(a) End economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government or
its military, intelligence, or security agencies or personnel at the expense of the
Cuban people.
(b) Ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba.
(c) Support the economic embargo of Cuba described in section 4(7) of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (the embargo), includ-
ing by opposing measures that call for an end to the embargo at the United Nations
can reverse them. And that I will do unless the Castro regime meets our demands. Not my demands—our
demands. . . . Those demands will include religious and political freedom for the Cuban people, and the freeing
of political prisoners.”).
16 Background Briefing on the President’s Cuba Policy, supra note 1.
17 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Considers Rolling Back Obama’s Opening with Cuba, N.Y. TIMES (May 31,
2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/world/americas/cuba-trump.html.
18 Background Briefing on the President’s Cuba Policy, supra note 1.
19 Id. [Editors’ note: “Individual people-to-people travel is educational travel that: (i) does not involve academic
study pursuant to a degree program; and (ii) does not take place under the auspices of an organization that is sub-
ject to U.S. jurisdiction that sponsors such exchanges to promote people-to-people contact.” SeeU.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions on President Trump’s Cuba
Announcement (June 16, 2017), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/cuba_faqs_20170616.pdf.]
20 Background Briefing on the President’s Cuba Policy, supra note 1; see alsoWhite House Press Release, Fact
Sheet on Cuba Policy (June 16, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/16/fact-sheet-
cuba-policy.
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and other international forums and through regular reporting on whether the con-
ditions of a transition government exist in Cuba.
(d) Amplify efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet ser-
vices, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel.
(e) Not reinstate the “Wet Foot, Dry Foot” policy, which encouraged untold thousands
of Cuban nationals to risk their lives to travel unlawfully to the United States.
(f) Ensure that engagement between the United States and Cuba advances the interests
of the United States and the Cuban people. These interests include: advancing
Cuban human rights; encouraging the growth of a Cuban private sector indepen-
dent of government control; enforcing final orders of removal against Cuban nation-
als in the United States; protecting the national security and public health and safety
of the United States, including through proper engagement on criminal cases and
working to ensure the return of fugitives from American justice living in Cuba or
being harbored by the Cuban government; supporting United States agriculture
and protecting plant and animal health; advancing the understanding of the
United States regarding scientific and environmental challenges; and facilitating
safe civil aviation.21
The memorandum thus reflects both change and continuity. As explained during the
White House press briefing, the changes would be implemented by regulations that would
be subsequently adopted by the secretaries of Treasury and Commerce.22 The decision not to
reinstate the “wet foot, dry foot” policy reflects continuity with the Obama administration’s
abandonment of that policy; in addition, some of the shared “interests” of the United States
and the Cuban people track the subjects of the bilateral agreements that the United States had
reached with Cuba at the end of the Obama administration.23
In addition to rolling out this policy, the Trump Administration has also contended with a
bizarre series of medical issues plaguing U.S. diplomats in the country. A press report indi-
cated that at least six diplomats had been flown to the University ofMiami’s hospital since the
beginning of the year, suffering from symptoms including headaches, dizziness, and hearing
loss that, according to one source, appeared to have been caused by some kind of sonic wave
machine.24
A State Department spokesperson first acknowledged the problem during a press confer-
ence on August 9, 2017, saying:
[S]ome U.S. Government personnel who were working at our embassy in Havana, Cuba
on official duties—so they were there working on behalf of the U.S. embassy there—
they’ve reported some incidents which have caused a variety of physical symptoms.
21White House Press Release, National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the
United States Toward Cuba (June 16, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/16/
national-security-presidential-memorandum-strengthening-policy-united.
22 Background Briefing on the President’s Cuba Policy, supra note 1.
23 See supra notes 5–10.
24 Frances Robles & Kirk Semple, ‘Health Attacks’ on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba Baffle Both Countries, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 11, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/world/americas/cuba-united-states-embassy-diplo-
mats-illness.html.
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I’mnot going to be able to give you a ton of information about this today, but I’ll tell you
what we do have that we can provide so far.
We don’t have any definitive answers about the source or the cause of what we consider to
be incidents. We can tell you that on May 23rd, the State Department took further
action. We asked two officials who were accredited at the Embassy of Cuba in the
United States to depart the United States. Those two individuals have departed the
United States. We take this situation very seriously. One of the things we talk about
here often is that the safety and security of American citizens at home and abroad is
our top priority. We’re taking that situation seriously and it’s under investigation right
now.25
In response to journalists’ questions, the spokesperson said that “we first heard about these
incidents back in late 2016,” and they have caused some State Department employees to seek
medical attention: “What this requires is providing medical examinations to these people.
Initially when they started reporting what I will just call symptoms, it took time to figure
out what this was, and this is still ongoing. So we’re monitoring it.”26 The spokesperson
also noted Cuba’s international obligations:
The Cuban Government has a responsibility and an obligation under the [Vienna]
Convention to protect our diplomats, so that is part of the reason why this is such a
major concern of ours, why we take this so seriously, and in addition to the protection
and security of Americans.27
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the state hosting a diplomatic mis-
sion “is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or
impairment of its dignity.”28
Cuba has repeatedly denied any role in the incidents. On September 19, the Cuban
embassy in Washington DC issued the following statement:
Cuba strictly observes its obligations to protect foreign diplomats on its soil. Cuba has
never perpetrated nor will it ever perpetrate actions of this nature, and has never permit-
ted nor will it ever permit any third-party use of its territory for this purpose.29
On September 26, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson met with Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla,
the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to a press release from the Cuban ministry
of foreign affairs:
25 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Press Briefing (Aug. 9, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/
08/273288.htm.
26 Id.
27 Id. (reflecting a corrected version of the transcript, which initially referred to the “Geneva Convention”).
28 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 22(2), Apr. 18, 1961, 500 UNTS 95 [hereinafter
VCDR].
29Matthew Lee,Cuba Denies Role in ‘Sonic Attacks’ that Left U.S. Diplomats with Brain Damage, TIME (Sept. 19,
2017), at http://time.com/4949115/cuba-sonic-attack-brain-damage-deaf.
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The Cuban ForeignMinister reiterated the seriousness, celerity and professionalism with
which the Cuban authorities have taken on this issue. Following instructions from the
top level of the Cuban government, a priority investigation was opened as from the
moment these incidents were first reported and additional measures were adopted to pro-
tect the US diplomats and their relatives. This has been recognized by the representatives
of the US specialized agencies who have travelled to Cuba as from June, whose visits have
been considered as positive by the Cuban counterparts.
Minister Bruno reiterated to Secretary Tillerson how important it was for the US author-
ities to cooperate, in an effective way, with the Cuban authorities in order to clarify these
incidents, which are unprecedented in Cuba.
He likewise reaffirmed Secretary Tillerson that the decision and the argument claimed by
the US Government to withdraw two Cuban diplomats from Washington were unwar-
ranted and emphasized that Cuba strictly abides by its obligations under the Vienna
Convention on the protection and integrity of diplomats, an area in which it keeps an
impeccable record.
He reaffirmed that the Cuban government has never perpetrated nor will it
ever perpetrate attacks of any kind against diplomats. The Cuban government has
never permitted nor will it ever permit the use of its territory by third parties for this
purpose.30
Despite the Cuban government’s assurances, at the end of September, the U.S. State
Department ordered the withdrawal of all non-emergency employees from the Cuban
embassy. Tillerson announced:
Over the past several months, 21 U.S. Embassy employees have suffered a variety of inju-
ries from attacks of an unknown nature. The affected individuals have exhibited a range
of physical symptoms, including ear complaints, hearing loss, dizziness, headache,
fatigue, cognitive issues, and difficulty sleeping. Investigators have been unable to deter-
mine who is responsible or what is causing these attacks.
On September 29, the Department ordered the departure of non-emergency personnel
assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Havana, as well as all family members. Until the
Government of Cuba can ensure the safety of our diplomats in Cuba, our Embassy
will be reduced to emergency personnel in order to minimize the number of diplomats
at risk of exposure to harm.
In conjunction with the ordered departure of our diplomatic personnel, the Department
has issued a Travel Warning advising U.S. citizens to avoid travel to Cuba and informing
them of our decision to draw down our diplomatic staff. We have no reports that private
U.S. citizens have been affected, but the attacks are known to have occurred in U.S. dip-
lomatic residences and hotels frequented by U.S. citizens. TheDepartment does not have
30 Cuba’s Representative Office Abroad Press Release, Cuban Foreign Minister Meets with US Secretary of
State (Sept. 26, 2017), at http://misiones.minrex.gob.cu/en/articulo/press-release-cuban-foreign-minister-
meets-us-secretary-state.
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definitive answers on the cause or source of the attacks and is unable to recommend a
means to mitigate exposure.
The decision to reduce our diplomatic presence in Havana was made to ensure the safety
of our personnel. We maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba, and our work in Cuba
continues to be guided by the national security and foreign policy interests of the United
States. Cuba has told us it will continue to investigate these attacks and we will continue
to cooperate with them in this effort.
The health, safety, and well-being of our Embassy community is our greatest concern. We
will continue to aggressively investigate these attacks until the matter is resolved.31
The travel advisory Tillerson referenced warns U.S. citizens not to travel to Cuba, explaining:
“Because our personnel’s safety is at risk, and we are unable to identify the source of the
attacks, we believe U.S. citizens may also be at risk and warn them not to travel to
Cuba.”32 A notice issued the same day by the U.S. embassy in Havana informed travelers:
“Due to the drawdown in staff, the U.S. Embassy in Havana has limited ability to assist
U.S. citizens. The Embassy will provide only emergency services to U.S. citizens.”33 In addi-
tion, the U.S. embassy informed visa applicants that, as of September 29, “the U.S.
Department of State suspended almost all visa processing in Havana,” and that the U.S.
Embassy in Havana has cancelled “[a]ll previously-scheduled nonimmigrant and immigrant
visa interview appointments.”34
In response, Josefina Vidal, a senior Cuban diplomat, said:
We consider that the decision announced by the Department of State is hasty and that it
will affect the bilateral relations, specifically, the cooperation inmatters of mutual interest
and the exchanges on different fields between both countries.
I wish to reaffirm Cuba’s willingness to continue an active cooperation between the
authorities of both countries, to fully clarify these incidents, for which purpose a more
effective involvement by the United States will be essential.35
Notwithstanding these affirmations from the Cuban government, a few days later, the
Department of State ordered the departure of fifteen officials from the Cuban Embassy in
Washington DC. Announcing the decision, a State Department spokesperson said:
The decisions do not signal a change of policy or determination of responsibility for the
attacks on U.S. Government personnel in Cuba. Investigations into those attacks are still
31 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Actions Taken in Response to Attacks on U.S. Government Personnel in
Cuba (Sept. 29, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/09/274514.htm.
32 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Cuba Travel Warning (Sept. 29, 2017), at https://travel.state.gov/content/
passports/en/alertswarnings/cuba-travel-warning.html.
33 U.S. Embassy in Cuba Press Release, Security Message for U.S. Citizens: Cuba Travel Warning (Sept. 29,
2017), at https://cu.usembassy.gov/security-message-u-s-citizens-cuba-travel-warning.
34 U.S. Embassy in Cuba, Visas, at https://cu.usembassy.gov/visas; see also Ernesto Londoño, U.S. Halt in Visa
Services Leaves Cuban Families in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/
world/americas/cuba-us-visas.html.
35 Cuba’s Representative Office Abroad Press Release, Statement to the Press by General Director for US
Affairs, Josefina Vidal Ferreiro (Sept. 29, 2017), at http://misiones.minrex.gob.cu/en/articulo/statement-press-
general-director-us-affairs-josefina-vidal-ferreiro.
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ongoing. Regarding the attacks, there are now 22 people who have been medically con-
firmed to have experienced health effects due to the attacks on diplomatic personnel in
Havana. The Cuban Government has told us it will continue the investigation into the
attacks, and we will continue to cooperate with them in this effort. We will also continue
our own investigation into the attacks.36
The spokesperson explained that the decision to expel the Cuban diplomats was made “due to
Cuba’s inability to protect our diplomats in Havana, as well as to ensure equity in the impact
of our respective operations.”37 In response to a question from a journalist about how the
individuals were chosen, she said:
The people serving here in their embassy did what we believe some of the similar jobs as
our folks down in the embassy in Cuba. We have a reduced ability to do our work in
Cuba because of the attacks on our Americans, okay? They now will have a reduced abil-
ity to do their jobs as well.38
Opponents of normalizing relations with Cuba cheered this development and urged the
Trump administration to go still further and declare all Cuban diplomats in the United
States “persona non grata.”39 The Cuban foreign minister, however, described the expul-
sion of Cuban diplomats as “eminently political” as well as “unwarranted and
unjustifiable.”40
To date, it appears that neither the Trump administration’s June 16 policy announcement
nor the dispute over the medical problems suffered by U.S. diplomatic staff has precluded
continued implementation of the bilateral agreements reached between Cuba and the
United States. The United States has not publicly repudiated any of the agreements. For
its part, Cuba affirmed its continued “readiness to actively implement the bilateral accords
that have been formalized over the past two years” in September.41
36 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Press Briefing (Oct. 3, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/
10/274592.htm [hereinafter Oct. 3 Press Briefing]; see alsoU.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Press Statement, Rex
W. Tillerson, Washington, DC (Oct. 3, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/10/274570.
htm.
37 Oct. 3 Press Briefing, supra note 36.
38 Id.
39 Gardiner Harris, Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Ernesto Londoño,U.S. Expels 15 Cuban Diplomats, in Latest Sign
DétenteMay Be Ending, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/world/americas/us-
cuba-diplomats.html; see also VCDR, supra note 27, Art. 9.
40 Harris, Hirschfeld Davis & Londoño, supra note 39.
41 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba Press Release, Sixth Cuba-US Bilateral Commission Meeting Held in
WashingtonDC (Sept. 19, 2017), at http://www.minrex.gob.cu/en/sixth-cuba-us-bilateral-commission-meeting-
held-washington-dc. Themedia note from theU.S. Department of State did not directly address these agreements,
saying instead: “The delegations also reviewed the Administration’s priorities and areas for engagement in the
interests of the United States and the Cuban people, including human rights; implementation of the
Migration Accords; and protecting the national security and public health and safety of the United States.”
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, United States and Cuba Hold Sixth Bilateral Commission Meeting in
Washington, DC (Sept. 20, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/09/274281.htm.
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INTERNATIONAL OCEANS, ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND AVIATION LAW
United States Announces Plans to Withdraw from Paris Agreement on Climate Change
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.76
On September 3, 2016, the United States deposited with the UN its instrument of accep-
tance for the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.1 The agreement entered into force on
November 4, 2016.2 Following the change of U.S. presidential administrations, new
President Donald Trump announced less than seven months later that the United States
would withdraw from the Agreement.3 On August 4, 2017, the United States communicated
this intention to the United Nations secretary-general, who serves as the depositary for the
agreement.4
Article 28 of the Paris Agreement sets out two routes for withdrawal. The United States’
withdrawal follows the first route, which allows for withdrawal after a period of delay:
1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into
force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written noti-
fication to the Depositary.
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt
by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be spec-
ified in the notification of withdrawal.5
Under these provisions, the earliest date that a withdrawal can take effect is November 4,
2020—exactly four years after the Paris Agreement entered into force.
The second route allows for faster withdrawals if withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is
coupled with a withdrawal from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). The United States, which has been a party to the UNFCCC since
1992,6 did not take this more drastic step.7 Article 28 of the Paris Agreement provides:
1 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, John Kerry Remarks, U.S. and China Joining the Paris Agreement (Sept. 3,
2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/09/261567.htm.
2 The Paris Agreement, Apr. 22, 2016, TIAS No. 16-1104, available at http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/
items/9485.php [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
3White House Press Release, President Donald Trump, Statement on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017),
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord
[hereinafter Trump Statement].
4 U.S. Dep’t. of State Press Release, Communication Regarding Intent to Withdraw from Paris Agreement
(Aug. 4, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm [hereinafter Aug. 4 Press Release].
5 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 28.
6 Status of Ratification of the Convention, UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, at http://unfccc.
int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php. See generally Marian Nash (Leich),
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 87 AJIL 103 (1993) (providing an overview of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change).
7 In its withdrawal statement, the United States indicated that it “will continue to participate in international
climate change negotiations and meetings, including the 23rd Conference of the Parties (COP-23) of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change, to protect U.S. interests and ensure all future policy options remain
open to the administration. Such participation will include ongoing negotiations related to guidance for imple-
menting the Paris Agreement.” Aug. 4 Press Release, supra note 4.
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“Any Party that withdraws from the [UNFCCC] shall be considered as also having withdrawn
from this Agreement.”8 Withdrawals from the UNFCCC are effective after a one-year delay.9
In a June 1 speech, President Trump explained his decision to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement:
As President, I can put no other consideration before the wellbeing of American citizens.
The Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington entering into an
agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries,
leaving American workers—who I love—and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost
jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production.
Thus, as of today, theUnited States will cease all implementation of the non-binding Paris
Accord and the draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement imposes on our
country. This includes ending the implementation of the nationally determined contribu-
tion and, very importantly, the Green Climate Fund which is costing the United States a
vast fortune.
Compliance with the terms of the Paris Accord and the onerous energy restrictions it has
placed on the United States could cost America as much as 2.7 million lost jobs by 2025
according to the National Economic Research Associates. This includes 440,000 fewer
manufacturing jobs—not what we need—believe me, this is not what we need—includ-
ing automobile jobs, and the further decimation of vital American industries on which
countless communities rely. . . .
Not only does this deal subject our citizens to harsh economic restrictions, it fails to live up
to our environmental ideals. As someone who cares deeply about the environment, which
I do, I cannot in good conscience support a deal that punishes theUnited States—which is
what it does-–the world’s leader in environmental protection, while imposing no mean-
ingful obligations on the world’s leading polluters.
For example, under the agreement, China will be able to increase these emissions by a
staggering number of years—13. They can do whatever they want for 13 years. Not us.
India makes its participation contingent on receiving billions and billions and billions of
dollars in foreign aid from developed countries. There are many other examples. But the
bottom line is that the Paris Accord is very unfair, at the highest level, to the United States.
Further, while the current agreement effectively blocks the development of clean coal in
America which it does, and the mines are starting to open up. We’re having a big opening
in two weeks. Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, so many places. A big opening of a
brand-new mine. It’s unheard of. For many, many years, that hasn’t happened. . . .
China will be allowed to build hundreds of additional coal plants. So we can’t build the
plants, but they can, according to this agreement. India will be allowed to double its coal
production by 2020. Think of it: India can double their coal production.We’re supposed
to get rid of ours. Even Europe is allowed to continue construction of coal plants.
8 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 28.
9 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 25, May 9, 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 [here-
inafter UNFCCC].
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In short, the agreement doesn’t eliminate coal jobs, it just transfers those jobs out of
America and the United States, and ships them to foreign countries. This agreement is
less about the climate and more about other countries gaining a financial advantage
over the United States. The rest of the world applauded when we signed the Paris
Agreement—they went wild; they were so happy—for the simple reason that it put our
country, the United States of America, which we all love, at a very, very big economic
disadvantage. A cynic would say the obvious reason for economic competitors and their
wish to see us remain in the agreement is so that we continue to suffer this self-inflicted
major economic wound.Wewould find it very hard to compete with other countries from
other parts of the world. . . .
The agreement is a massive redistribution of United States wealth to other countries. . . .
Even if the Paris Agreement were implemented in full, with total compliance from all
nations, it is estimated it would only produce a two-tenths of one degree—think of
that; this much—Celsius reduction in global temperature by the year 2100. Tiny, tiny
amount. . . .
Beyond the severe energy restrictions inflicted by the Paris Accord, it includes yet another
scheme to redistribute wealth out of the United States through the so-called Green
Climate Fund—nice name—which calls for developed countries to send $100 billion
to developing countries all on top of America’s existing andmassive foreign aid payments.
So we’re going to be paying billions and billions and billions of dollars, and we’re already
way ahead of anybody else.Many of the other countries haven’t spent anything, andmany
of them will never pay one dime.
The Green Fund would likely obligate the United States to commit potentially tens of
billions of dollars of which the United States has already handed over $1 billion— nobody
else is even close; most of them haven’t even paid anything—including funds raided out of
America’s budget for the war against terrorism. That’s where they came. Believe me, they
didn’t come from me. They came just before I came into office. Not good. And not good
the way they took the money. . . .
There are serious legal and constitutional issues as well. Foreign leaders in Europe, Asia,
and across the world should not have more to say with respect to the U.S. economy than
our own citizens and their elected representatives. Thus, our withdrawal from the agree-
ment represents a reassertion of America’s sovereignty. . . .
Staying in the agreement could also pose serious obstacles for theUnited States as we begin
the process of unlocking the restrictions on America’s abundant energy reserves, which we
have started very strongly. It would once have been unthinkable that an international
agreement could prevent the United States from conducting its own domestic economic
affairs, but this is the new reality we face if we do not leave the agreement or if we do not
negotiate a far better deal.
The risks grow as historically these agreements only tend to becomemore andmore ambi-
tious over time. In other words, the Paris framework is a starting point—as bad as it is—
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not an end point. And exiting the agreement protects the United States from future intru-
sions on the United States’ sovereignty and massive future legal liability. Believe me, we
have massive legal liability if we stay in.
As President, I have one obligation, and that obligation is to the American people. The
Paris Accord would undermine our economy, hamstring our workers, weaken our sover-
eignty, impose unacceptable legal risks, and put us at a permanent disadvantage to the
other countries of the world. It is time to exit the Paris Accord . . . and time to pursue
a new deal that protects the environment, our companies, our citizens, and our country.10
President Trump’s decision to “end[] the implementation of the nationally determined
contribution” referenced the Paris Agreement obligation for each Party to “prepare, commu-
nicate andmaintain successive nationally determined contributions [NDCs] that it intends to
achieve.”11 Former President Obama had communicated the United States’ initial NDC on
March 31, 2015,12 indicating that “[t]he United States intends to achieve an economy-wide
target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26%–28% below its 2005 level in 2025
and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%.”13
As a matter of international law, the United States will remain a party to the Paris
Agreement until November 4, 2020, when its withdrawal will become effective. So long as
it remains a party,14 the United States must “pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the
aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions”—i.e., the NDCs as defined by the
United States.15
The Paris Agreement does not, however, explicitly prohibit the United States from lower-
ing those NDC objectives. The agreement states that “[a] Party may at any time adjust its
existing nationally determined contribution with a view to enhancing its level of ambition.”16
The agreement also states that “[e]ach Party’s successive nationally determined contribution
will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribu-
tion and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated respon-
sibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”17 Susan
Biniaz, the State Department’s lead climate change lawyer throughout the negotiations of the
Paris Agreement, explained: “The Paris agreement provides for contributions to be nationally
determined and it encourages countries, if they decide to change their targets, to make them
10 Trump Statement, supra note 3.
11 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4(2). See generally Kristina Daugirdas & Julian D. Mortenson,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 110 AJIL 374 (2016) (providing an overview of the agreement’s
requirements).
12 INDCs as Communicated by Parties, UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, at http://www4.
unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx.
13 U.S. Cover Note INDC and Accompanying Information, available at http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/
INDC/Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%
20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf.
14 Duncan Hollis, What to Look for in Any U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, OPINIO JURIS (June 1,
2017), at http://opiniojuris.org/2017/06/01/what-to-look-for-in-any-us-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement;
Daniel Bodansky, Sound and Fury on the Paris Agreement – But Does It Signify Anything?, OPINIO JURIS (June 2,
2017), at http://opiniojuris.org/2017/06/02/33147.
15 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 4(2).
16 Id. Art. 4(11).
17 Id. Art. 4(3).
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more ambitious, . . . [b]ut it doesn’t legally prohibit them from changing them in another
direction.”18 Following the announcement, she opined that
[i]t seems very unnecessary to have to withdraw from the Paris agreement if the concern is
focused on the U.S. emissions target and financial contributions[.] . . . The U.S. can uni-
laterally change its emissions target under the agreement—it doesn’t have to “renegoti-
ate” it . . . .19
The Paris Agreement does not require the United States to make particular contributions
to the Green Climate Fund, which was established in 2010 to help “developing countries
limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change . . . .”20
Article 9 of the Paris Agreement provides that “[d]eveloped country Parties shall provide
financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and
adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.”21 So far,
the United States has contributed $1 billion of a $3 billion pledge made to the fund by former
President Obama.22
Many world leaders criticized the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.23
President Emmanuel Macron of France, in a twist on the U.S. president’s campaign slogan,
tweeted “Make Our Planet Great Again” and created a website, under that domain, to
encourage researchers and entrepreneurs supportive of climate change to emigrate to
France.24 Prime Minister Charles Michel of Belgium tweeted, “I condemn this brutal act
against #ParisAccord.”25 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada was “deeply
disappointed.”26 Germany, France, and Italy, together, “t[ook] note with regret.”27
18 Juliet Eilperin, In the Trump White House, the Momentum Has Turned Against the Paris Climate Agreement,
WASH. POST (May 3, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/02/in-
the-trump-white-house-the-momentum-has-turned-against-the-paris-climate-agreement.
19 Chris Mooney, Trump’s Reasons for Leaving the Paris Climate Agreement Just Don’t Add Up, WASH. POST
(June 1, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/06/01/trumps-rea
sons-for-leaving-the-paris-climate-agreement-just-dont-add-up.
20 About the Fund, GREEN CLIMATE FUND, at http://www.greenclimate.fund/who-we-are/about-the-fund.
21 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, Art. 9(1); see alsoMooney, supra note 19 (quoting Biniaz as saying that “finan-
cial contributions are voluntary”); Daniel Bodansky,The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A NewHope?, 110 AJIL
288, 309–11 (2016) (Paris Agreement does not create any new substantive financial obligations).
22 Chris Mooney, Days Before Trump’s Inauguration, State Dept. Sends $500 Million to United Nations Climate
Fund, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/
01/17/days-before-trumps-inauguration-state-dept-sends-500-million-to-united-nations-climate-fund.
23 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html.
24 Nicholas Vinocur,Macron Trolls Trump with ‘Make Our Planet Great Again’Website, POLITICO (EU) (June 8,
2017), at http://www.politico.eu/article/macron-trolls-trump-with-make-our-planet-great-again-website; Make
Our Planet Great Again, at https://www.makeourplanetgreatagain.fr; Somini Sengupta, Melissa Eddy, Chris
Buckley & Alissa J. Rubin, As Trump Exits Paris Agreement, Other Nations Are Defiant, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/world/europe/climate-paris-agreement-trump-china.html.
25 Sengupta, Eddy, Buckley & Rubin, supra note 24.
26 Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada Press Release, Statement in Response to the United States’
Decision to Withdraw from the Paris Agreement (June 1, 2017), at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/06/01/state-
ment-prime-minister-canada-response-united-states-decision-withdraw-paris [hereinafter Trudeau Statement].
27 Paolo Gentiloni, Emmanuel Macron & Angela Merkel, Prime Minister of Italy, President of France, &
Chancellor of Germany, Dichiarazione Italia-Germania-Francia sull’annuncio degli USA dell’uscita
dall’Accordo di Parigi sul clima (June 1, 2017), at http://www.governo.it/articolo/dichiarazione-italia-
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The spokesperson for the secretary-general of the UN expressed “major
disappointment.”28
In conjunction with his announcement that the United States would withdraw from the
Paris Agreement, President Trump announced that he will seek to renegotiate it. He stated:
[W]e will start to negotiate, and we will see if we canmake a deal that’s fair. And if we can,
that’s great. And if we can’t, that’s fine. . . . I’m willing to immediately work with
Democratic leaders to either negotiate our way back into Paris, under the terms that
are fair to the United States and its workers, or to negotiate a new deal that protects
our country and its taxpayers. . . . So if the obstructionists want to get together with
me, let’s make them non-obstructionists. We will all sit down, and we will get back
into the deal. And we’ll make it good, and we won’t be closing up our factories, and
we won’t be losing our jobs. And we’ll sit down with the Democrats and all of the people
that represent either the Paris Accord or something that we can do that’s much better
than the Paris Accord. And I think the people of our country will be thrilled, and I
think then the people of the world will be thrilled. But until we do that, we’re out of
the agreement.”29
It is unclear how strong the administration’s desire to renegotiate is. As of August 4, 2017,
the State Department told its diplomats that at this time, “there are no plans to seek to rene-
gotiate or amend the text of the Paris Agreement, or begin negotiations toward a new agree-
ment.”30 Additionally, according to press reports, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson instructed
diplomats to sidestep questions regarding what it would take for the U.S. to reengage.31
Even if the U.S. commits to renegotiation, Christiana Figueres, the former executive sec-
retary of UNFCCC who led the negotiations on the agreement, expressed doubts about the
feasibility of this approach.32Most world leaders have rejected this possibility, andmany took
the opportunity to reaffirm their countries’ commitment to the Paris Agreement and com-
bating climate change.33 Prime Minister Trudeau stated “Canada is unwavering in our com-
mitment to fight climate change and support clean economic growth. . . . While the U.S.
decision is disheartening, we remain inspired by the growing momentum around the
world to combat climate change . . . .”34 Germany, France, and Italy issued an emphatic
germania-francia-sullannuncio-degli-usa-delluscita-dallaccordo-di [hereinafter Gentilioni, Macron & Merkel
Statement].
28 Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the UN, Statement on the US Decision to
Withdraw from the Paris Agreement (June 1, 2017), at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-
06-01/statement-attributable-spokesman-secretary-general-us-decision.
29 Trump Statement, supra note 3.
30 Yeganeh Torbati & Valerie Volcovici, Exclusive: U.S. Envoys Told To Be Coy on Re-engaging in Paris Climate
Deal – Cable, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2017), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climate-diplomacy/exclusive-u-
s-envoys-told-to-be-coy-on-re-engaging-in-paris-climate-deal-cable-idUSKBN1AO276.
31 Id.
32 Sengupta, Eddy, Buckley &Rubin, supra note 24; Kevin Loria, Paris Climate Agreement Architect: This Was a
“Vacuous Political Melodrama,” BUS. INSIDER (June 1, 2017), at http://www.businessinsider.com/christiana-fig-
ueres-trump-decision-to-pull-us-out-of-paris-agreement-2017-6.
33 Sengupta, Eddy, Buckley & Rubin, supra note 24.
34 Trudeau Statement, supra note 26.
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joint statement supporting the Paris Agreement calling it “a cornerstone . . . for effectively and
timely tackling climate change.”35 They stated:
We deem the momentum generated in Paris in December 2015 irreversible and we
firmly believe that the Paris Agreement cannot be renegotiated, since it is a vital instru-
ment for our planet, societies and economies.
We are convinced that the implementation of the Paris Agreement offers substantial eco-
nomic opportunities for prosperity and growth in our countries and on a global scale.
We therefore reaffirm our strongest commitment to swiftly implement the Paris
Agreement, including its climate finance goals and we encourage all our partners to
speed up their action to combat climate change.
We will step up efforts to support developing countries, in particular the poorest and
most vulnerable, in achieving their mitigation and adaptation goals.36
China also made statements, both before and after President Trump’s announcement, reaf-
firming the Chinese commitment to the agreement.37
The G-20 also issued a declaration responding to the United States’ decision to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement. The leaders of the G-20 (with the exception of the United States)
stated:
We take note of the decision of the United States of America to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement. The United States of America announced it will immediately cease the
implementation of its current nationally-determined contribution. . . . The Leaders of
the other G20 members state that the Paris Agreement is irreversible. We reiterate the
importance of fulfilling the UNFCCC commitment by developed countries in providing
means of implementation including financial resources to assist developing countries
with respect to both mitigation and adaptation actions in line with Paris outcomes. . . .
We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Paris Agreement, moving swiftly towards
its full implementation in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national
circumstances.”38
The G-20 (except for the United States) also announced the G20 Hamburg Climate and
Energy Action Plan for Growth, an annex to the Leaders’ Declaration, promising to
move forward to implement[] our current and future Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) in line with the Paris Agreement. We will increase cooperation
among ourselves and with non-G20 countries to facilitate mutual learning, good practice
35 Gentiloni, Macron & Merkel Statement, supra note 27.
36 Id.
37 Sengupta, Eddy, Buckley & Rubin, supra note 24; Michael D. Shear & Coral Davenport, World Leaders
Increase Pressure on Trump to Stay in Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/26/world/europe/paris-climate-agreement-trump-g7.html.
38 G20 Leaders’Declaration: Shaping an Interconnected World, 10, July 7/8, 2017, available at https://www.
g20.org/gipfeldokumente/G20-leaders-declaration.pdf.
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sharing and capacity-building, including through existing fora, inter alia, such as the
NDC Partnership.39
Notably, following Trump’s announcement, numerous state and local officials declared
their intention to support the Paris Agreement within the limits of their respective jurisdic-
tions and authority. Thirteen states and Puerto Rico have joined the U.S. Climate Alliance, a
“bi-partisan coalition of states . . . committed to the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement.”40 One of those states, Hawaii, has already
passed legislation committing the state to the goals and limits of the Paris Agreement.41
Nearly four hundred mayors across the country have joined the Mayors National Climate
Action Agenda, to “work[] together to strengthen local efforts for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.”42 The U.S. Conference of Mayors stated that it “strongly opposes President
Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and has vowed that the nation’s mayors
will continue their commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to alleviate the impacts of
global warming.”43
Several individual elected officials engaged directly with foreign officials as well. Governor
Jerry Brown of California travelled to China to meet with President Xi Jinping personally to
discuss climate change.44 The governor and the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology
signed an agreement to collaborate on green energy technology.45 Brown has also proposed
hosting a global environmental summit in San Francisco in 2018.46 He has explicitly said,
“President Trump is trying to get out of the Paris agreement, but he doesn’t speak for the rest
of America.”47 Prime Minister Trudeau spoke about shared climate change goals to the
National Governors Association.48 (For his part, Trudeau indicated that “Canada will
39 G20, Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth, Annex to G20 Leaders Declaration, July 7/8,
2017, at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2017/2017-g20-climate-and-energy-en.pdf.
40 U.S. CLIMATE ALLIANCE, at https://www.usclimatealliance.org.
41 Jonah Engel Bromwich, Defying Trump, Hawaii Becomes First State to Pass Law Committing to Paris Climate
Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/climate/hawaii-climate-paris-
trump.html.
42 CLIMATE MAYORS, at http://climatemayors.org.
43 Sara Durr,Mayors Strongly Oppose Withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord, THE U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS (June
1, 2017), at https://www.usmayors.org/2017/06/01/mayors-strongly-oppose-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-
accord.
44 Jessica Meyers, Jerry Brown in China with a Climate Message to the World: Don’t Follow America’s Lead, L.A.
TIMES (June 7, 2017), at http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-brown-china-20170607-story.html; Javier C.
Hernandez & Adam Nagourney, As Trump Steps Back, Jerry Brown Talks Climate Change in China, N.Y.
TIMES (June 6, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-jerry-brown-califor-
nia-climate.html.
45 Associated Press, China and California Sign Deal to Work on Climate Change Without Trump, GUARDIAN
(June 6, 2017), at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jun/07/china-and-california-sign-deal-to-work-
on-climate-change-without-trump; Meyers, supra note 44.
46 Lisa Friedman, Jerry Brown Announces Climate Summit Meeting in California, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/climate/jerry-brown-california-climate-summit.html; Melanie Mason,
Evan Halper & Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Brown Unveils Plan for Global Climate Summit, Further Undercutting
Trump’s Agenda, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2017), at http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-jerry-brown-climate-
summit-20170706-story.html.
47 Friedman, supra note 46.
48 Alexander Burns, Going Around Trump, Governors Embark on Their Own Diplomatic Missions, N.Y. TIMES
(July 15, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/15/us/trump-governors-diplomatic-missions.html.
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continue to work with the U.S. at the state level, and with other U.S. stakeholders, to address
climate change and promote clean growth.”49)
Some business leaders also reacted strongly, both in opposing the withdrawal announce-
ment and reaffirming their commitment to combating climate change.50 Anticipating fund-
ing gaps following Trump’s announcement regarding withdrawal from the Paris Agreement,
former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg’s charitable organization, Bloomberg
Philanthropies, committed $15 million to support the work of the UNFCCC secretariat.51
Bloomberg has also organized mayors, governors, state attorneys general, and business
CEOs to take “America’s Pledge.”52 Together the group has declared “We Are Still In”
and eventually plans to develop and submit to the UN a “societal NDC” based on the efforts
of state and local governments, businesses, and other subnational actors.53 In a letter to the
UN, Bloomberg stated:
Today, on behalf of an unprecedented collection of U.S. cities, states, businesses and
other organizations, I am communicating to the United Nations and the global commu-
nity that American society remains committed to achieving the emission reductions we
pledged to make in Paris in 2015. . . . I am confident the broad array of leaders and orga-
nizations that have signed today’s declaration, and many others that will join in the days
to come, will work together to reduce U.S. carbon emissions by 26 percent by 2025, just
as we had pledged in Paris. These groups will take vigorous and ambitious actions to
address climate change, and we will communicate those actions in a transparent and
accountable way to the UN. The United States can, and will, meet its commitment
under the Paris Agreement.54
49 Trudeau Statement, supra note 26.
50 Abigail Abrams & Lucinda Shen, ‘Climate Change is Real’: Business Leaders React to President Trump’s
Withdrawal from Paris Agreement, FORTUNE (June 2, 2017), at http://fortune.com/2017/06/01/paris-climate-
agreement-business-leaders-react.
51 Kristine Phillips, Michael Bloomberg Pledges His Own Money to Help U.N. After Trump Pulls Out of Paris
Climate Deal, WASH. POST (June 3, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/
2017/06/03/michael-bloomberg-pledges-his-own-money-to-help-u-n-after-trump-pulls-out-of-paris-climate-
deal; Bloomberg Philanthropies Press Release,Mike Bloomberg Doubles Down to Ensure AmericaWill Fulfill the
Paris Agreement (June 1, 2017), at https://www.bloomberg.org/press/releases/bloomberg-philanthropies-com-
mits-15-million-fill-budget-gap-left-trumps-revoking-us-support-un-climate-treaty.
52 Bloomberg Philanthropies Press Release,Mike Bloomberg Sends Statement to the UnitedNations Following
Unprecedented Outpouring of Support for Paris Agreement (June 5, 2017), at https://www.bloomberg.org/press/
releases/mike-bloomberg-sends-statement-united-nations-following-unprecedented-outpouring-support-paris-
agreement; AMERICA’S PLEDGE, at https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com; Hiroko Tabuchi & Lisa Friedman,
U.S. Cities, States and Businesses Pledge to Measure Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/07/11/climate/cities-states-businesses-emissions-climate-pact.html.
53 Bloomberg Philanthropies Press Release, supra note 52.
54 Id.
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
President Trump Issues Trade-Related Executive Orders and Memoranda
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.81
The United States’ total trade deficit in 2016 was $502.3 billion.1 President Trump
believes that the deficit—and especially its consequences (“wealth . . . stripped from our coun-
try”), causes (“bad trade deals”), and images (“shuttered factories”)—played a prominent role
in his electoral success in 2016.2 Since taking office, Trump has signed a series of executive
orders and memoranda on trade in order to fulfill various campaign promises on this front.3
The executive orders and memoranda focus mainly on gathering information and laying
groundwork for future executive action. Taken together, they signal the Trump administra-
tion’s intention to address the United States’ trade deficits, especially with China.
OnMarch 31, President Trump signed two executive orders related to trade enforcement. The
first—titled “Omnibus Report on Significant Trade Deficits”—requires the U.S. Department of
Commerce and U.S. Trade Representative to identify trading partners with which the United
States ran a significant trade deficit in goods in 2016.4 The executive order requires these agencies
to submit to the president a report that, for each identified trading partner, shall
(a) assess the major causes of the trade deficit, including, as applicable, differential tar-
iffs, non-tariff barriers, injurious dumping, injurious government subsidization,
intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, denial of worker rights and
labor standards, and any other form of discrimination against the commerce of
the United States or other factors contributing to the deficit;
(b) assess whether the trading partner is, directly or indirectly, imposing unequal bur-
dens on, or unfairly discriminating in fact against, the commerce of the United
States by law, regulation, or practice and thereby placing the commerce of the
United States at an unfair disadvantage;
(c) assess the effects of the trade relationship on the production capacity and strength of
the manufacturing and defense industrial bases of the United States;
(d) assess the effects of the trade relationship on employment and wage growth in the
United States; and
(e) identify imports and trade practices that may be impairing the national security of
the United States.5
1 Bureau of Economic Analysis Press Release, 2016 Trade Gap Is $502.3 Billion (Feb. 7, 2017), available at
https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/trade/2017/pdf/trad1216annual_fax.pdf.
2 White House Press Release, Remarks by President Trump et al. at Signing of Trade Executive Orders (Mar. 31,
2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/31/remarks-president-trump-et-al-signing-trade-
executive-orders [hereinafter Mar. 31 White House Press Release].
3 See, e.g., White House Press Release, Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Commerce (Apr. 20,
2017), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700259/pdf/DCPD-201700259.pdf [hereinafter
Presidential Memorandum Regarding Steel Imports].
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At the signing ceremony, President Trump announced that the findings in the
omnibus report would be used to take “necessary and lawful action to end those many
abuses.”6
Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, who is taking the lead on preparing the report, said
that enforcement of international trade obligations is a “very primary objective of this admin-
istration on trade.”7 Notably, in order to impose antidumping or countervailing duties under
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, a member state must determine whether there is
evidence of dumped or subsidized imports, material injury to the domestic industry, and a
causal link between the two; then the member state must conduct an impartial investigation
which gives all interested parties—including foreign producers—”full opportunity for the
defense of their interests.”8
The second executive order issued at the end of March focuses on collection of antidump-
ing and countervailing duties and enforcement of U.S. trade and customs laws. The order
provides, in relevant part:
Sec. 3. Implementation Plan Development. Within 90 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative, develop a plan
that would require covered importers that, based on a risk assessment conducted by
[Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)], pose a risk to the revenue of the United States,
to provide security for antidumping and countervailing duty liability through bonds
and other legal measures, and also would identify other appropriate enforcement mea-
sures. . . .
Sec. 4. Trade and Suspected Customs Law Violations Enforcement.
(a) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
through the Commissioner of CBP, shall develop and implement a strategy and
plan for combating violations of United States trade and customs laws for goods
and for enabling interdiction and disposal, including through methods other than
seizure, of inadmissible merchandise entering through any mode of transportation,
to the extent authorized by law.
(b) To ensure the timely and efficient enforcement of laws protecting Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) holders from the importation of counterfeit goods, the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take all
appropriate steps, including rulemaking if necessary, to ensure that CBP can, con-
sistent with law, share with rights holders:
6 See Mar. 31 White House Press Release, supra note 2.
7 Vicki Needham, Trump Signs Executive Orders Ramping Up Trade Enforcement, HILL (Mar. 31, 2017), at
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/326803-trump-signs-executive-orders-ramping-up-trade-enforcement.
8 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-
Dumping Agreement), 1868 UNTS 201, available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.pdf
(providing threshold requirements for initiating an investigation in Article 5 and regulating the procedure of inves-
tigations in Article 6); see also Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1869 UNTS 14, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf.
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(i) any information necessary to determine whether there has been an IPR
infringement or violation; and
(ii) any information regarding merchandise voluntarily abandoned . . . before
seizure, if the Commissioner of CBP reasonably believes that the successful
importation of the merchandise would have violated United States trade
laws.
Sec. 5. Priority Enforcement. The AttorneyGeneral, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, shall develop recommended prosecution practices and allocate
appropriate resources to ensure that Federal prosecutors accord a high priority to prose-
cuting significant offenses related to violations of trade laws.9
Explaining the motivations behind the executive order, Secretary of Commerce Ross said
that he was “horrified” by the ways in which “very clever” foreign exporters dodged billions of
dollars in antidumping and countervailing duties by “setting up shell companies here so when
the fine [i.e., duty] is levied there is no way to collect.”10 This charge tracks reports that some
foreign exporters have established shell companies to evade such payments,11 misrepresented
the country of origin of goods, transshipped goods to hide their origin, and otherwise mis-
classified goods.12 The Government Accountability Office found in July 2016 that CBP had
failed to collect $2.3 billion in antidumping and countervailing duties between 2001 and
2014, due in part “to the U.S. government’s retrospective and complex process for determin-
ing final [antidumping/countervailing duty] duty rates.”13
Section 3 of the executive order requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
develop a plan to combat certain importers’ potential nonpayment and evasion by requiring
those importers to post bonds and possibly fulfill other security requirements.14 Depending
on the form, severity, and reasonableness of these bonding requirements as ultimately
9 Executive Order 13785, Establishing Enhanced Collection and Enforcement of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties and Violations of Trade and Customs Laws, 82 Fed. Reg. 16719 (Mar. 31, 2017), at
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/05/2017-06967/establishing-enhanced-collection-and-
enforcement-of-antidumping-and-countervailing-duties-and.
10 Needham, supra note 7.
11White House Issues Two Executive Orders Related to Trade Enforcement, SIDLEY UPDATES (Apr. 3, 2017), avail-
able at https://www.sidley.com/~/media/update-pdfs/2017/04/20170403-intl-trade-update.pdf.
12 U.S. Customs and the New Trump Administration: Your Top Ten Questions Answered, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP
(Feb. 7, 2017), at https://www.foley.com/us-customs-and-the-new-trump-administration-your-top-ten-ques-
tions-answered-02-07-2017.
13 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: CBP Action
Needed to Reduce Duty Processing Errors and Mitigate Nonpayment Risk (July 2016), available at http://
www.gao.gov/assets/680/678419.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GAO Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
Report]. The report does not make findings of bad faith, but a comment from U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) filed in the appendix of the report notes that the GAO statistical analysis may “understate
the impact of the duty evasion issues relating to high-risk imports from China.” Id. at Appendix IV.
14 These steps build on the 2015 Enforce and Protect Act, which “establishe[d] formal procedures for submit-
ting and investigating antidumping or countervailing allegations of evasion against” foreign exporters. See The
Enforce and Protect Act, 19 USC §1517 (2016), at https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade-enforcement/tftea/
enforce-and-protect-act-eapa [hereinafter EAPA]. On August 14, 2017, the CBP issued its first final decision
under EAPA authority, finding that certain wire hangers were transshipped from China through Thailand to
avoid antidumping duties, in one of its many recent investigations of illegal imports from China. See U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Exercises EAPA
Authority, Launches Multiple Investigations on Illegal Imports from China (Aug. 17, 2017), at https://www.cbp.
gov/newsroom/national-media-release/us-customs-and-border-protection-exercises-eapa-authority-launches.
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promulgated by DHS, they may face challenge at the WTO.15 In 2005, both national courts
and the WTO Appellate Body upheld challenges to certain enhanced bonding requirements
on imported shrimp; in the Appellate Body’s case, finding that bonds are a form of antidump-
ing duty under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and thus subject to a
reasonableness requirement, relative to the margin of dumping.16
When asked about President Trump’s March 31 executive orders and the Trump admin-
istration’s concerns with the United States’ trade deficit with China, China’s Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang said:
You may say that China holds a trade surplus on trade in goods, but the US also has huge
trade surplus in services. Even in terms of trade in goods, 40% of China’s trade surplus
was created by US enterprises operating in China. China-US trade and economic rela-
tions have developed to such a stage that the two countries’ interests are inextricably inter-
twined. For issues that might crop up amid cooperation, the two sides should properly
resolve them through consultation. I said yesterday that we hope that China and the US
could work together to make bigger the cake of common interests, which the two sides
certainly have the potential to achieve, instead of bending over on which side grabs a
larger share.17
In April, President Trump signed two memoranda for the Secretary of Commerce initiat-
ing investigations into the ways in which large volumes of excess capacity may affect national
security (the first dealt with steel; the second with aluminum).18 These memoranda provide,
in identical language (excepting the substitution of “steel” with “aluminum”), that:
The Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) has initiated an investigation under section
232(b)(1)(A) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (the “Act”) (19 U.S.C. 1862(b)(1)(A))
to determine the effects on national security of steel [aluminum] imports. In conducting
this investigation, and in accordance with section 232(d) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1862(d)),
the Secretary shall, as appropriate and consistent with law:
(a) consider the domestic production of steel [aluminum] needed for projected national
defense requirements; the capacity of domestic industries to meet such require-
ments; the existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, products,
raw materials, and other supplies and services essential to the national defense; the
15 U.S. GAO Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Report, supra note 13.
16 Nat’l Fisheries Inst., Inc. v. United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 30 C.I.T. 1838
(Nov. 13, 2006), available at https://www.cbp.gov/bulletins/41slipops1.pdf; Appellate Body Report, United
States—Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties, United
States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS345/AB/R (circulated July 16, 2008), available
at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/343_345abr_e.pdf.
17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Press Release, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference (Mar. 31, 2017), at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/
s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1450613.shtml.
18 Presidential Memorandum Regarding Steel Imports, supra note 3; White House Press Release, Presidential
Memorandum for the Secretary of Commerce (Apr. 27, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/presidential-memorandum-secretary-commerce [hereinafter Presidential Memorandum Regarding
Aluminum Imports].
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requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services, including
the investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth; and
the importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use
as those affect such industries and the capacity of the United States to meet national
security requirements;
(b) recognize the close relation of the Nation’s economic welfare to our national secur-
ity, and consider the effect of foreign competition in the steel [aluminum] industry
on the economic welfare of domestic industries;
(c) consider any substantial unemployment, decrease in government revenues, loss of
skills or investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any
domestic products by excessive steel [aluminum] imports; and
(d) consider the status and likely effectiveness of efforts of the United States to negotiate
a reduction in the levels of excess steel [aluminum] capacity worldwide.19
The Secretary of Commerce is to submit a report and provide recommendations.20
In conjunction with the memorandum on steel, Secretary of Commerce Ross explained:
Over the years, we’ve conducted 152 steel cases against improper imports of one type of
steel or another, and we have another 25 cases pending. The problem with those anti-
dumping and countervailing duty cases is they’re very, very limited in nature to a very,
very specific product from a very, very specific country. So what really happens is you’ll
bring the action and that will help eliminate the problem with that one little product
from that one country. That country then will start shipping something else in, or they’ll
modify slightly the product to get around the order, or they will ship it in through another
country and pretend that it came from a country not subject to the duties.
So it’s a fairly porous system, and while it has accomplished some fair measure of reduc-
tion, it doesn’t solve the whole problem. So we’re groping here to see whether the facts
warrant a more comprehensive solution that would deal with a very wide range of steel
products and a very wide range of countries.21
The international community’s reaction to these Section 232 investigations was generally
negative. At a June 2017 meeting of the WTO Goods Council, Russia said that the United
States should refrain from these Section 232 investigations and instead rely on “concerted
action in the international community.”22 The EU said that a “proliferation of actions
from the US Section 232 investigations would pose ‘systemic risks.’”23 China said that
“US Section 232 investigations were inconsistent with the GATT and the “imports of
19 Presidential Memorandum Regarding Steel Imports, supra note 3; Presidential Memorandum Regarding
Aluminum Imports, supra note 18.
20 Id.
21 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross on the Memorandum
Regarding the Investigation Pursuant to Section 232(B) of the Trade Expansion Act (Apr. 20, 2017), at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-memorandum-regarding-
investigation-pursuant-section-232b-trade-expansion-act.
22World Trade Organization Press Release, National Security Cited in Two Trade Concerns at Goods Council
Meeting (June 30, 2017), at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/good_10jul17_e.htm.
23 Id.
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steel and aluminum were not a threat to national security.”24 Notably, Article XXI of the
GATT (“Security Exceptions”) provides: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
. . . to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests”25—though whether member states are
entirely free to judge their own security needs remains unsettled and uncontroversial.
The Trump administration took additional trade related measures on April 28, when the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) released its annual Special 301 Report. As
with every report since USTR began publishing them in 1989, this year’s report placed China on
its Priority Watch List of countries about which USTR has significant intellectual property (IP)
concerns—this year citing insufficient protection of trade secrets, manufacture of counterfeit
goods, piracy in e-commerce markets, conditioning market access on disclosure of IP, lack of
promotion of indigenous innovation through patents and other policies, and lack of effective
redress in civil courts.26 In response, China’s Ministry of Commerce released a statement say-
ing that China had “serious concerns” about the “widely opposed” “unfair report,” and that
China accords a “high priority to IPR protection.”27
OnApril 29, President Trump celebrated the 100th day of his presidency by holding a rally
at the site of a company that has produced shovels continuously in Pennsylvania since 1774.28
There he announced his signing of two more executive orders addressing trade issues.29 The
first—titled “Addressing Trade Agreement Violations and Abuses”—provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Conduct Performance Reviews. The Secretary of Commerce and the United
States Trade Representative (USTR), in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Office of
Trade and Manufacturing Policy, shall conduct comprehensive performance reviews of:
(a) all bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral trade agreements and investment agree-
ments to which the United States is a party; and
(b) all trade relations with countries governed by the rules of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) with which the United States does not have free trade agree-
ments but with which the United States runs significant trade deficits in goods.
Sec. 3. Report of Violations and Abuses.
24 Id.
25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 UNTS 194, at https://www.wto.
org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXI [hereinafter GATT].
26 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (Apr. 28, 2017), available
at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20Report%20FINAL.PDF; see, e.g., OFFICE
OF THEUNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1989 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (May 25, 1989), available at https://ustr.
gov/sites/default/files/1989%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf.
27Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China Press Release, Regular Press Conference of theMinistry of
Commerce –May 11, 2017 (May 12, 2017), at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201705/
20170502577390.shtml.
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(a) Each performance review shall be submitted to the President by the Secretary of
Commerce and the USTR within 180 days of the date of this order and shall
identify:
(i) those violations or abuses of any United States trade agreement, investment
agreement, WTO rule governing any trade relation under the WTO, or trade
preference program that are harming American workers or domestic manufac-
turers, farmers, or ranchers; harming our intellectual property rights; reducing
our rate of innovation; or impairing domestic research and development;
(ii) unfair treatment by trade and investment partners that is harming American
workers or domestic manufacturers, farmers, or ranchers; harming our intellec-
tual property rights; reducing our rate of innovation; or impairing domestic
research and development;
(iii) instances where a trade agreement, investment agreement, trade relation, or
trade preference program has failed with regard to such factors as predicted
new jobs created, favorable effects on the trade balance, expanded market access,
lowered trade barriers, or increased United States exports; and
(iv) lawful and appropriate actions to remedy or correct deficiencies identified pur-
suant to subsections (a)(i) through (a)(iii) of this section.
(b) The findings of the performance reviews required by this order shall help guide
United States trade policy and trade negotiations.
Sec. 4. Remedy of Trade Violations and Abuses. The Secretary of Commerce, the USTR,
and other heads of executive departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall take every
appropriate and lawful action to address violations of trade law, abuses of trade law, or
instances of unfair treatment.30
In a statement accompanying the signing of the two executive orders, President Trump
said that if trade violations and abuses identified by the performance reviews “don’t get cleared
up, [Secretary of Commerce] Wilbur [Ross] will end the trade agreements.”31 The second
April 29 executive order created the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (OTMP)
and instructed the office to:
(a) advise the President on innovative strategies and promote trade policies consistent
with the President’s stated goals;
(b) serve as a liaison between the White House and the Department of Commerce and
undertake trade-related special projects as requested by the President; and
(c) help improve the performance of the executive branch’s domestic procurement and
hiring policies, including through the implementation of the policies described in
Executive Order 13788 of April 18, 2017 (Buy American and Hire American).32
30 Executive Order 13796, Addressing Trade Agreement Violations and Abuses, 82 Fed. Reg. 20819 (Apr. 29,
2017), at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/05/04/2017-09156/addressing-trade-agreement-vio-
lations-and-abuses.
31White House Press Release, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Executive Orders on Trade (Apr. 29,
2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-orders-
trade [hereinafter Apr. 29 White House Press Release].
32 Executive Order 13797, Establishment of Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, 82 Fed. Reg. 20821
(Apr. 29, 2017), at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/05/04/2017-09161/establishment-of-
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According to the president’s statement, the mission of the OTMP is to “defend American
workers and companies from those who would steal our jobs and threaten our manufacturing
base.”33
China responded by emphasizing a more positive conception of trade with the United
States. China’s Ministry of Commerce described U.S.-China trade as “win-win cooperation”
and the “natural result of advantage complementarity,” and stated that concerns should be
addressed by “bilateral pragmatic cooperation.”34 The ministry’s comments coincided with
the release of a report titled “Research Report on China-US Economic and Trade Relations”
that, though generally optimistic, lays out China’s areas of concern in the area of U.S.-China
trade: use of unfair benchmarks in calculating dumpingmargins inWTO antidumping inves-
tigations of China; U.S. export control against China; unfair treatment of Chinese enterprises
investing in the United States, and abuses of trade remedymeasures of the United States.35 As
for allegations that the U.S. is abusing trade remedy measures, the report states that
the US has a tendency to use alternative state, separate rates, public institutions, external
benchmarks and other unfair approaches, with the intention to impose abnormally high
tax rates on Chinese products, which has definitely hindered Chinese exports to the
US.36
On August 14, President Trump signed another memorandum directing the USTR to
evaluate whether to investigate China’s practices with respect to intellectual property:
The United States Trade Representative shall determine, consistent with section 302(b)
of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2412(b)), whether to investigate any of China’s
laws, policies, practices, or actions that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and
that may be harming American intellectual property rights, innovation, or technology
development.37
office-of-trade-and-manufacturing-policy. Through Executive Order 13788, President Trump established that
“[i]t shall be the policy of the executive branch to buy American and hire American.” That order provides, in part:
In order to promote economic and national security and to help stimulate economic growth, create good jobs
at decent wages, strengthen ourmiddle class, and support the Americanmanufacturing and defense industrial
bases, it shall be the policy of the executive branch to maximize, consistent with law, through terms and
conditions of Federal financial assistance awards and Federal procurements, the use of goods, products,
and materials produced in the United States.
Executive Order 1378, Buy American and Hire American, 82 Fed. Reg. 18837 (Apr. 18, 2017), at https://www.
federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/21/2017-08311/buy-american-and-hire-american.
33 See Apr. 29 White House Press Release, supra note 31.
34Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China Press Release, Regular Press Conference of theMinistry of
Commerce - May 25, 2017 (May 27, 2017), at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201706/
20170602585140.shtml.
35 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China Press Release, Research Report on China-US
Economic and Trade Relations (Courtesy Translation) (May 25, 2017), available at http://images.mofcom.
gov.cn/www/201705/20170525093626470.pdf.
36 Id.
37White House Press Release, Presidential Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative (Aug. 14,
2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/14/presidential-memorandum-united-states-
trade-representative.
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In response, Chinese ForeignMinistry Spokesperson Hua Chunying emphasized three broad
points:
[F]irst, we think the US should not be a spoiler of multilateral rules; second, any protec-
tionist action by the US side will surely undermine the bilateral economic and trade rela-
tions as well as the interests of both Chinese and American enterprises; third, if the US
take measures that are harmful to bilateral economic and trade relations in disregard of
facts and with no respect to multilateral rules, the Chinese side will never sit idly and will
take every appropriate measure to resolutely uphold its lawful rights and interests.38
Notably, the Trump administration has suggested that it may connect its actions on trade—
especially with China—with its separate attempts to deal with North Korea’s nuclear bellig-
erence. On April 11, President Trump tweeted, “I explained to the President of China that a
trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem!”39
President Trump has continued to link the two issues during the subsequent months. On
September 3, President Trump tweeted, “The United States is considering, in addition to
other options, stopping all trade with any country doing business with North Korea.”40
USE OF FORCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION
United States, Russia, and Jordan Sign Limited Ceasefire for Syria
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.80
As the civil war in Syria continues, some of the key actors have sought ways to reduce the
conflict’s toll on civilians.1 In May, 2007, Russia and the United States began exploring the
possibility of establishing “safe” or “de-escalation” zones.2 On July 7, this dialogue yielded a
trilateral agreement and memorandum signed by Russia, the United States, and Jordan to
establish a ceasefire in southwest Syria.3 The resulting ceasefire—the first in Syria signed
38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Press Release, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference (Aug. 15, 2017), at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1484923.shtml.
39 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2017, 4:59 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/851766546825347076.
40 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 3, 2017, 9:14 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/904377075049656322.
1 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 781
(2017).
2 SeeWhite House Press Release, Readout of President Donald J. Trump’s Call with President Vladimir Putin
of the Russian Federation (May 2, 2017), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/02/readout-
president-donald-j-trumps-call-president-vladimir-putin-russian (describing telephone discussion between
Trump and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin regarding “safe, or de-escalation,” zones); see also Suleiman
Al-Khalidi, U.S., Russia Discuss De-escalation Zone for Southwest Syria: Diplomats, REUTERS (June 9, 2017), at
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-deraa-idUSKBN1902HR (describing a series of meetings
between the Russian and U.S. special envoys for Syria regarding the possible addition of new de-escalation zones).
3 White House Press Release, Press Briefing on the President’s Meetings at the G20 (July 7, 2017), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/07/07/press-briefing-presidents-meetings-g20-july-7-2017; Zachary
Cohen & Kevin Liptak, Tillerson: Trump, Putin Reach Syria Ceasefire Agreement, CNN (July 8, 2017), at http://
www.cnn.com/2017/07/07/politics/syria-ceasefire-us-russia-tillerson/index.html.
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by the Trump administration—governs hostilities between Syrian government forces and
associated troops on one side and rebels on the other. It began on July 9.4
The text of the agreement is confidential,5 but Trump administration officials have
described its key parameters. According to Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for
the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, the agreement is “essentially an undertaking to use
our influence, the Jordanians, their influence, the Russians to use their influence with all
of the sides of the conflict to stop the fighting, to essentially freeze the conflict.”6 One signifi-
cant feature of the ceasefire is that it divides the territory covered by the agreement into two
areas, with United States-associated forces on one side and Syrian and Russian-associated
forces on the other. According to McGurk:
. . . if you take the southwest, what we did there—and I think quite successfully—is a very
painstaking negotiation with Jordan and with Russia and with us trilaterally to map out a
very detailed—we call it a line of contact—between opposition and regime forces. And
everybody agreed on that line of contact, and that is the ceasefire line.
This is the first time we have had a ceasefire with a very detailed negotiated line. It’s a very
different endeavor than just declaring a ceasefire in a particular area. So we have a very
detailed, painstakingly negotiated ceasefire line.7
McGurk described the agreement as “phase one” of de-escalating the Syrian civil war.8 A
Senior State Department Official elaborated on the description of the agreement as an
“interim step”:
The idea is it should create a better environment to discuss a broader and more compre-
hensive southwest de-escalation area in greater detail. We felt that a ceasefire—near-term
ceasefire—was important because the violence in the southwest, although historically,
over the course of the conflict, it has been . . . less than other parts of Syria, the violence
has steadily increased in the south since February, with both the Syrian regime and oppo-
sition defenses threatening to derail any potential for progress there . . . .
Now, the agreement . . . previews additional steps that we think we’re going to have to
take to strengthen and solidify that ceasefire, and those steps would include potential
deployment of monitoring forces to the area, and as Secretary Tillerson noted, that’s
something that we’re close to an understanding on but we’re not in a position to
announce in detail on that yet; and also formation of an effective monitoring cell, an
4 A Tripartite Agreement to Back the Ceasefire in South-West of Syria, PETRA (July 7, 2017), at http://petra.gov.jo/
Public_News/Nws_NewsDetails.aspx?lang=2&site_id=1&NewsID=308533&CatID=13.
5 SeeColum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, DanDe Luce& PaulMcCleary, Secret Details of Trump-Putin Syria Cease-
fire Focus on Iranian Proxies, FOREIGN POLICY (July 11, 2017), at http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/11/exclusive-
trump-putin-ceasefire-agreement-focuses-on-iranian-backed-fighters-middle-east.
6 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Background Briefing on the Ceasefire in Syria (July 7, 2017), at https://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/07/272433.htm [hereinafter Background Briefing].
7 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Brett McGurk, Briefing on the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS (July 13,
2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/07/272601.htm [hereinafter McGurk briefing]. See also Laura
Rozen,US Touts Success of Syria Cease-fire Negotiated with Russia, AL-MONITOR (Aug. 9, 2017), at http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/us-russia-ceasefire-syria-trump-cooperation-sanctions.html.
8 McGurk Briefing, supra note 7.
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arrangement by which the parties could participate and monitor the details of the cease-
fire and violations.9
The agreement did not address monitoring and compliance.10 Shortly after the agreement
was announced, Russia indicated its willingness to deploy monitors.11 On August 23, the
Jordanian Embassy announced that, as envisioned by the ceasefire agreement, the Amman
Center for Ceasefire Control, with participation by representatives from Jordan, Russia,
and the United States, started its official work to “monitor, stabilise, and deepen” the
ceasefire.12
Early reports indicate that the ceasefire has held. On July 14, Russian Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Maria Zakharova said that the situation on the ground was “steady” and
noted that the ceasefire might “be an example for other areas in Idlib province.”13 A
month into the ceasefire, Department of State spokesperson Heather Nauert offered the fol-
lowing assessment of its progress:
[T]hat ceasefire, to my understanding, is still holding. Okay? We are pleased with that.
That provides the United States and the coalition partners with the opportunity to start
to get some humanitarian in—that is so badly needed in that area. And so . . . we’ve been
able to start reaching some of the vulnerable Syrians without the complications of avoid-
ing airstrikes or increases in violence. We’re continuing to work with our international
partners to assess the ongoing emergency humanitarian needs throughout Syria and facil-
itate the delivery of vitally needed supplies.
I’m also told that people are starting to slowly come back into parts of those areas,
which . . . we would consider to be a moderate success at this point, and we look forward
to that happening eventually.14
9 Background Briefing, supra note 6.
10 McGurk Briefing, supra note 7 (“So that’s a very active and ongoing discussion, and it’s also a very detailed
discussion in terms of where monitors would go and how it would work. There are sensitivities in this area. There
are some spoilers on the ground that neither side can control. So I would just say, given we have this very detailed
kind of de-confliction arrangement or detailed line of contact, we’re now looking at kind of where the monitors
would go. So that discussion is very much ongoing, and I’m hopeful over the next week or so we can get some-
where.”); Background Briefing, supra note 6 (“[T]here’s a lot of discussions ahead of us still, including about some
very important elements, including how to monitor the ceasefire, the rules that would govern the southwest de-
escalation area, all of these—the presence of monitors. All of this will be the subject of ongoing talks.”).
11U.S. Says Russia Willing to Deploy Monitors for Syria Ceasefire, REUTERS (July 13, 2017), at https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa/u-s-says-russia-willing-to-deploy-monitors-for-syria-ceasefire-idUSKBN19Y27Q
(“‘The Russians havemade clear they’re very serious about this and willing to put some of their people on the ground
to help monitor from the regime side,’ McGurk told reporters. ‘They do not want the regime violating the
ceasefire.’”).
12 The Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Press Release, Amman Centre for South Syria Ceasefire
Control Embarks on Mission (Aug. 23, 2017), at http://jordanembassyus.org/news/amman-centre-south-syria-
ceasefire-control-embarks-mission.
13 Russian Foreign Ministry Press Release, Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova,
Moscow (July 14, 2017), at http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-/asset_publisher/
D2wHaWMCU6Od/content/id/2815668.
14 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Department Press Briefing (Aug. 10, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/dpb/2017/08/273325.htm.
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On September 11, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov likewise described the ceasefire
“successful.”15
USE OF FORCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION
Trump Administration Recertifies Iranian Compliance with JCPOA Notwithstanding Increasing
Concern with Iranian Behavior
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.79
In July 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany,
and the European Union adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Pursuant to that agreement, Iran committed to limiting the scope and content of its nuclear
program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other
signatories.1 By law, the U.S. State Department is required to certify Iran’s compliance with
the agreement every ninety days.2 The Trump administration first certified Iran’s compliance
with the agreement in April 2017, albeit reluctantly.3 In its first certification, the Trump
administration expressed ongoing concern about Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism,4 and
repeated previous criticism of the JCPOA as “fail[ing] to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear
Iran.”5
In the followingmonths, the Trump administration continued to criticize the agreement as
it conducted an interagency review of its policy toward Iran. In an address to the Arms
Control Association on June 2, 2017, a senior National Security Council official noted
that the Trump administration was reassessing the United States’ commitment to the JCPOA:
We are in the middle of an ongoing Iran review. . . . It is a broader review than just of the
JCPOA. . . . One of our complaints, as we see it, about the previous administration was
the degree to which, having gotten a nuclear deal it was a tempting conclusion to make
other aspects of Iran policy sort of hostage to that deal. . . . We felt that there is a—an
unwelcome reluctance to press back and hold Iran accountable on those fronts for fear
that oh, my goodness, if you make them too mad they’ll walk away from the deal. We are
determined not to make everything hostage to the nuclear question.6
15 Lavrov: Saudi Arabia Committed to Solve Syria Crisis, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 11, 2017), at http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2017/09/lavrov-saudi-arabia-committed-solve-syria-crisis-170911145838638.html.
1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, 55 ILM 103 (2016) [hereinafter JCPOA]; Kristina
Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 649 (2015); 110
AJIL 789 (2016).
2 See Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, Pub. L. No. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201 (2015).
3 Letter from Rex Tillerson, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives
(Apr. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Letter from Rex Tillerson]; see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 111 AJIL 776 (2017).
4 Letter from Rex Tillerson, supra note 3.
5 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson Press Availability (Apr. 19, 2017), at https://
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/270341.htm.
6 Chris Ford, Special Assistant to the President, Keynote Address at the 2017 Arms Control Association Annual
Meeting (June 2, 2017), at https://www.armscontrol.org/ArmsControl17#chrisford.
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On the same day, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—which has monitored
and verified Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related JCPOA commitments—released its
seventh report concluding that Iran had again implemented its commitments under the
JCPOA.7
The Trump administration nevertheless continued to criticize at a UN Security Council
meeting later that month.While the EU and other UN nations praised Iran for its implemen-
tation of the nuclear deal, U.S. Ambassador to the UNNikki Haley focused instead on Iran’s
repeated violations of UN Security Council Resolution 2231.8 UN Security Council
Resolution 2231, adopted in part to facilitate JCPOA implementation, provides:
Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile
technology, until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date
on which the IAEA submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is
earlier.9
Ambassador Haley cited “repeated ballistic missile launches, proven arms smuggling, and
illicit procurement of ballistic missile-related technology” as violations of the resolution.10
She reiterated that the administration was conducting an ongoing review of its policy toward
Iran, but noted that the United States would comply with its JCPOA commitments at least
until the review was completed.11
Despite these criticisms, the Trump administration issued its second formal certification of
Iran’s compliance with the nuclear agreement on July 17, 2017.12 The press release announc-
ing the certification, stated:
[T]he United States continues to waive sanctions as required to continue implementing
U.S. sanctions-lifting commitments in the JCPOA, and is certifying to Congress that,
based on available information, the conditions of Section 135(d)(6) of the of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, including as amended by the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-17), enacted on May 22,
2015, are met as of July 17, 2017.13
The press release also stressed, however, that “Iran’s continued malign activities outside the
nuclear issue undermine the positive contributions to regional and international peace and
security that the deal was supposed to provide.”14 Accordingly, the statement also announced
7 IAEA Director General, Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (June 2, 2017), available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/
gov2017-24.pdf.
8 U.S.Mission to the UnitedNations Press Release, Nikki Haley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Non-proliferation in Iran (June 29, 2017), at https://
usun.state.gov/remarks/7886 [hereinafter June 29 Haley Remarks].
9 S.C. Res. 2231, Annex B, para. 3 (July 20, 2015).
10 June 29 Haley Remarks, supra note 8.
11 Id.
12 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, U.S. Announces New Iran-Related Sanctions (July 17, 2017), at https://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/07/272635.htm [July 17 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release].
13 Id.
14 Id.
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that the Trump administration had sanctioned eighteen entities and individuals for “support-
ing Iran’s ballistic missile program and for supporting Iran’s military procurement or Iran’s
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)” as well as an Iran-based transnational crime
organization.15 The State Department specifically designated the IRGC Aerospace Force
Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (ASF SSJO) for involvement in Iranian ballistic missile
research and flight test launches and the IRGC Research and Self Sufficiency Jehad
Organization (RSSJO), for responsibility in the research and development of ballistic
missiles.16
In a press briefing, administration officials emphasized that the decision to combine recer-
tification with a new round of sanctions reflected the U.S. view that Iran has failed to comply
with the “spirit” of the JCPOA.17 For its part, Iran condemned the new round of sanctions as
illegal under the JCPOA and promised to “in turn impose new sanctions against a number of
other American persons and entities that have taken hostile steps against the Iranian people
and other Muslim nations in the region.”18
On July 27, 2017, Iran launched a Simorgh space launch vehicle, testing a rocket that
could deliver satellites into orbit.19 Although Iran denied that the rocket was a missile
designed to carry nuclear warheads,20 the United States, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom issued a joint statement condemning the launch.21 The United States viewed the
launch as “inconsistent with”Resolution 2231, noting in particular that “[s]pace launch vehi-
cles use technologies that are closely related to those of ballistic missiles development, in par-
ticular to those of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.”22 Accordingly, “Iran’s program to
develop ballistic missiles continues to be inconsistent with UN Security Council
Resolution 2231 and has a destabilizing impact in the region.”23 The United States did
not, however, describe the launch as a violation of the JCPOA.
In response to the space launch, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) imposed sanctions on six subsidiaries of Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
(SHIG), a company that is central to Iran’s ballistic missile program.24 OFAC explained
15 Id. The sanctions were designated pursuant to Executive Order 13382, targeting proliferators of weapons of
mass destruction, their means of delivery, and supporters of such activity. Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg.
38,567 (2005) and Executive Order 13581 (targeting transnational criminal organizations), Exec. Order No.
13,581, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,757 (2011).
16 July 17 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, supra note 12.
17 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Department Press Briefing (July 18, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/dpb/2017/07/272665.htm. The State Department specifically noted that a key purpose of the JCPOA is to
“contribute to regional and international peace and security” and the administration believes Iranian government
actions undermine this goal. Id.
18 Iran Vows Retaliation Against New US Sanctions, PRESSTV (July 18, 2017), at http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/
2017/07/18/528919/Iran-US-Foreign-Ministry-Sanctions-missile.
19 U.S. Says Iran Rocket Test Breaches U.N. Resolution, REUTERS (July 27, 2017), at https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-iran-satellite/u-s-says-iran-rocket-test-breaches-u-n-resolution-idUSKBN1AC1YY.
20 Id.
21 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Iran’s Space Launch Vehicle Inconsistent with UNSCR 2231 Joint




24 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Key Ballistic Missile Entities in Iran (July 28,
2017), at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0136.aspx. Shahid Hemmat Industrial
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that the sanctions were issued in response to “Iran’s continued provocative actions,” since
“[s]pace launch vehicles use technologies that are closely related to those of an intercontinen-
tal ballistic missile and this launch represents a threatening step by Iran.”25 These sanctions
were issued just hours after the U.S. Senate unanimously approved a U.S. House of
Representatives bill imposing additional sanctions on Iran in response to Iran’s ballistic mis-
sile program and for human rights abuses.26 President Trump signed the bill into law shortly
afterward on August 2, 2017.27
Iran lodged a formal complaint with the Joint Commission alleging that the new admin-
istrative and statutory sanctions violated the JCPOA.28 Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali
Larijani stated: “With regard to the imposition of new sanctions by the US, in addition to
diplomatic measures, which should be taken, a complaint had to be filed with the relevant
commission (the Iran-P5þ 1 Joint Commission) and this has been done.”29 Mr. Larijani
alleged that the new sanctions contradicted paragraphs 26, 28, and 29 of the JCPOA,30
which provide, respectively, that the “U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respec-
tive roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related
sanctions,”31 that the United States, as a member of the EU/EUþ 3, “commit[s] to imple-
ment this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect,
and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that
would undermine its successful implementation,”32 and that
the United States, consistent with [its] laws, will refrain from any policy specifically
intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic rela-
tions with Iran inconsistent with [its] commitments not to undermine the successful
implementation of this JCPOA.33
Per the procedures outlined in the agreement, the Joint Commission has fifteen days to
resolve such an issue before Iran can request the issue be elevated to an Advisory Board,
which after an additional fifteen days will provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance
Group (SHIG) itself, responsible for the development and production of Iran’s liquid propellant ballistic missiles,
is currently sanctioned under Executive Order 13382 and is also currently sanctioned by the United Nations and
the European Union. Id.
25 Id.
26 See Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No.155-44 (2017). The statute also
imposes sanctions on both Russia and North Korea. Id.
27 Presidential Statement on Signing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 2017DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Aug. 2, 2017).
28 Iran Complains to JCPOA Commission over New US Bans: Larijani, PRESSTV (Aug. 1, 2017), at http://www.
presstv.com/Detail/2017/08/01/530369/Iran-US-Security-Council-Ali-Larijani-Parliament-Speaker-sanctions
[hereinafter Iran Complains to JCPOA Commission]. The Joint Commission is made up of the eight members that
negotiated the JCPOA and oversees dispute resolution if any of the JCPOA participant states believe any or all of the
EU/EU+3 were “not meeting their commitments.” JCPOA, supra note 1, para. 36. See also Kristina Daugirdas &
Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 649, 652–53 (2015).
29 Iran Complains to JCPOA Commission, supra note 28.
30 Id.
31 JCPOA, supra note 1, para. 26.
32 Id., para. 28.
33 Id., para. 29.
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issue.34 The Commission, however, did not publicly comment on Iran’s complaint. A
spokesperson from the office of Frederica Mogherini, Joint Commission Chair, confirmed
only that Iran’s views about the permissibility of new sanctions had been “extensively dis-
cussed” at recent meetings.35
While continuing to express dissatisfaction with the JCPOA, U.S. officials also emphasized
their commitment tomonitoring Iran’s compliance with the agreement. On the day Iran filed
its complaint with the Joint Commission, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson acknowledged that,
although President Trump had “been pretty clear on his dissatisfaction with the JCPOA as a
tool or instrument,” the United States was
working with the other parties to that agreement, our European allies in particular, to
ensure that we are fully enforcing all aspects of that agreement, holding Iran accountable
for its commitments, and challenging whether Iran is, in fact, living up to its commit-
ments and the spirit of that agreement.36
For his part, President Trump warned on August 10, 2017, that “I don’t think Iran is in
compliance . . . and they are certainly not in the spirit of the agreement in compliance. And I
think you’ll see some very strong things taking place if they don’t get themselves in compli-
ance. But I do not believe they are in compliance right now.”37
On August 15, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani warned that the United States’ sanctions
activity might cause Iran to leave the JCPOA.He asserted that Iran could return to pre-JCPOA
conditions “not within months and weeks, but in a matter of hours and days.”38 U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley responded with the following statement:
Iran cannot be allowed to use the nuclear deal to hold the world hostage. Iran, under no
circumstances, can ever be allowed to have nuclear weapons. At the same time, however,
we must also continue to hold Iran responsible for its missile launches, support for ter-
rorism, disregard for human rights, and violations of UN Security Council resolutions.
The nuclear deal must not become “too big to fail.”39
On August 23, 2017, Ambassador Haley met with IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano
to express concern about the IAEA’s monitoring and verification of Iran’s compliance with
34 Id., para. 36. The Advisory Board would consist of three members, one appointed by each participant in the
dispute and a third independent member. Id.
35 Rick Gladstone, Iran Says New U.S. Sanctions Violate Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), at https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-trump-sanctions-complaint.html; see also
European Union External Action Service Press Release, Chair’s Statement Following the 21 July 2017
Meeting of the JCPOA Joint Commission (July 21, 2017), at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/30249/chairs-statement-following-21-july-2017-meeting-jcpoa-joint-commission_pt.
36 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Remarks at a Press Availability (Aug. 1, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/
secretary/remarks/2017/08/272979.htm.
37 Aaron Blake, Trump’s Tough-on-North Korea, Toned-Down-on-Russia Q&A Session, Annotated, WASH. POST
(Aug. 11, 2017), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/08/11/president-trumps-contrar-
ian-qa-session-with-reporters-annotated.
38 Iran Can Return to Pre-JCPOA State if US Slaps More Sanctions: Rouhani, PRESSTV (Aug. 15, 2017), at http://
www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/08/15/531846/Iran-nuclear-deal-US.
39 U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press Release, Nikki Haley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, Ambassador Haley on Iran’s Threats to Quit the JCPOA (August 15, 2017) at https://usun.
state.gov/remarks/7933.
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JCPOA.40 Ambassador Haley specifically pressed Director General Amano to seek new access
to additional suspected Iranian nuclear facilities and other military sites.41 Under the text of
the JCPOA, “if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or
activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under the
comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, the IAEA will provide Iran
the basis for such concerns and request clarification.”42 Under such circumstances, if Iran’s
clarification does not resolve IAEA concerns, “the Agencymay request access to such locations
for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activ-
ities inconsistent with the JCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons
for access in writing and will make available relevant information.”43
After Ambassador Haley’s meeting with Director General Amano, there was no public
indication that the Trump administration had presented any evidence that could serve as a
basis for an IAEA concern or request for clarification. A statement from the United States
Mission to the United Nations indicated that if such evidence were presented by the
IAEA, Iran would have to “follow the unambiguous access provisions of its IAEA safeguards
agreement, the Additional Protocol, and the JCPOA.”44 In response to reports about this
meeting, Iranian government spokesmanMohammad Baqer Nobakht stated: “Iran’s military
sites are off limits. . . . All information about these sites are classified. Iran will never allow such
visits. Don’t pay attention to such remarks that are only a dream.”45
Shortly after Ambassador Haley’s meeting with the director general, on August 31, 2017,
the IAEA issued its eighth verification of Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.46 Despite this
verification, Ambassador Haley emphasized in a speech several days later that the question of
Iranian compliance requires more than evaluating Iran’s execution of “the technical terms of
the nuclear agreement”; indeed, “[i]t requires a much more thorough look.”47 She insisted
Iran be evaluated not only by its compliance with the terms of the JCPOA, but also by “its
violations of Resolution 2231 and its long history of aggression,” its “repeated, demonstrated
hostility toward the United States,” its “history of deception about its nuclear program,” and
“its ongoing development of ballistic missile technology.”48 Accordingly, Haley stressed that
40 SeeU.S.Mission to the United Nations Press Release, Readout of aMeeting Between Ambassador Haley and
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Yukiya Amano (Aug. 23, 2017), at https://vienna.
usmission.gov/readout-meeting-ambassador-haley-director-general-international-atomic-energy-agency-yukiya-
amano.
41 Id.; see also U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press Release, Ambassador Haley on the Latest Iranian
Misbehavior (Aug. 31, 2017), at https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7950 [hereinafter Aug. 31 Haley Remarks].
42 JCPOA, supra note 1, Annex I, para. 75.
43 Id., Annex I, para. 76.
44 See Aug. 31 Haley Remarks, supra note 41.
45 Parisa Hafezi, Iran Rejects U.S. Demand for U.N. Visit to Military Sites, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2017), at https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa/iran-rejects-u-s-demand-for-u-n-visit-to-military-sites-idUSKC
N1B918E.
46 See IAEA Director General, Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (Aug. 31, 2017), available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/
gov2017-35.pdf.
47 Nikki Haley, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Address on Iran and the JCPOA to the
American Enterprise Institute (Sept. 5, 2017), at https://www.aei.org/publication/nikki-haley-address-on-iran-
and-the-jcpoa.
48 Id.
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“wemust consider the whole picture, not simply whether Iran has exceeded the JCPOA’s limit
on uranium enrichment. . . . That’s the judgment President Trump will make in October,”49
when the Trump administration is next scheduled to certify Iran’s compliance with the
JCPOA to Congress.
49 Id.
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW1062 Vol. 111:4
